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The Swan Song of a Dishonest Duck: A
Prototype for Analyzing Coverage Under the
Bankers Blanket Bond
Davis J. Howard*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Financial institutions, like individuals and other companies,
purchase insurance to avoid becoming economically crippled as a
result of direct loss or liability to third parties. ' Whether a bank is
large or small, it typically purchases several different types of insurance. 2 Almost all banks and savings and loan associations will
purchase a Bankers Blanket Bond 3 to protect against a variety of
direct losses caused by the torts or crimes of insiders or third par* Associate, Sills Cummis Zuckerman Radin Tischman Epstein & Gross, P.A.,
Newark, New Jersey. Lecturer-in-Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Newark, New
Jersey. B.A., Wagner College, 1976; J.D., Yale University, 1982.
1. For a relatively small price, the insured transfers its risk to a professional risktaker and thus receives a substantial benefit in the event that a covered loss is sustained.
The spreading of risk also benefits the insurance company and its owners because only a
small portion of insureds are likely to require the protection and reimbursement that their
policies provide. Finally, the public-at-large benefits in a number of ways. First, businesses and their dependents are no longer rendered insolvent due to catastrophic losses.
Second, because the ultimate risk is shifted to the majority of the insured public in the
form of increased premiums, most individual premium increases are nominal. See generally R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 1-3, 8-13 (West Practitioner's ed. 1988).
2. A bank will undoubtedly purchase a directors' and officers' liability insurance policy so that it will be entitled to reimbursement for indemnifying its directors and officers
in the event they are liable to third parties. W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF
CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 685-756 (4th ed. 1988). A bank will also
purchase the policy to insure its directors and officers in the event that the bank is unable
or unwilling to indemnify them. Id. Larger institutions purchase trust department errors
and omissions insurance for liability arising from negligent acts or omissions in handling
customers' trust accounts. Yeager, The Developing Law of Business Errorsand Omissions
Insurance, 89-92 (Practicing Law Institute 1983). Banks also purchase insurance typically issued to individuals, such as property, fire, automobile, and other general liability
coverage. Paris & Eurich, The New Commercial General Liability Policy, in Insurance
Coverage and Practice (May 12, 1988) (Defense Research Institute seminar material).
3. For a general analysis of a Bankers Blanket Bond, see infra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
In 1980, the Insurance and Protection Division of the American Bankers Association
reported that 89.4% of all banks had purchased some form of blanket bond insurance
and that 50% of all insurance premiums paid by banks during 1980 were for the purchase
of blanket bond insurance. Weldy, History and Development of the Bankers Blanket
Bond, in Bank Insurance: The Revised Bankers Blanket Bond and Directors and Officers
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ties intent on swindling these institutions. After all, as Willy Sutton responded when asked why he robbed banks: "That's where
they keep the money."
When a lawyer analyzes a Bankers Blanket Bond claim that
arises from the acts or omissions of a servicing contractor,4 the
lawyer will discover that neither case law nor commentary provides much assistance. Because the claim may implicate insuring
agreements found in the bond's standard form, case law dealing
with the subject may offer some general help. Such an analysis,
however, will be incomplete because the factual configuration of a
servicing contractor's claim is unique. In addition, financial institutions may purchase an optional insuring agreement known as a
Servicing Contractors Endorsement. This insuring agreement is
distinct from those found in the standard form of a pre-1986 blanket bond or a post-1986 financial institution bond.5
Liability and Insurance Coverage 1, 2 (Nov. 4, 1982) (Banking Law Institute seminar
material) [hereinafter History & Development].
4. In this context, a servicing contractor is a person or company authorized to collect
payments on real estate mortgages or home improvement loans on behalf of the financial
institution that is, according to the mortgage or loan agreements, ultimately entitled to
receive such payments. See CNA Insurance Companies, Servicing Contractors Coverage
Discovery Form, No. G-11082-A, revised to October 1983 (unpublished Chicago, Ill.)
[hereinafter CNA].
5. In 1986, the Surety Association of America changed the policy form's name from
"blanket bond" to "financial institution bond" because the term "blanket" was thought
to imply that the bond covered more losses than the draftsmen intended. See Fidelity
Trust Co. v. American Sur. Co. of N.Y., 268 F.2d 805, 807 (3d Cir. 1959) ("[the] term
'Blanket Bond' indicates that its coverage is to be wide and it is not unfair to interpret the
document in this fashion"); Century Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 4 Cal. 3d
319, 482 P.2d 193, 93 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1971) ("the very title of the policy... indicates that
coverage is to be wide"). With respect to bankers blanket bonds generally, see 9A J.
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 5701-5723, at 375-486 (1981 & Supp.
1988). Standard Form No. 24 is the blanket bond form that has been used since 1941. It
was revised in 1946, 1951, 1969, 1980, and 1986. Between each revision, new terms,
conditions, definitions, agreements, and exclusions were often added by rider. Typically,
a prior year's rider will become part of a subsequent year's standard form. Smirz, The
New Definition of Employee Dishonesty, 55 DEF. COUNS. J. 432 (1988). For the text of
the standard forms adopted in 1969, 1980, and 1986, see the specimen bonds contained in
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BOND LITIGATION: A CASE STUDY FOR BANKERS, SURETIES,

INSURERS AND ATTORNEYS 1-25 (A.B.A. Tort & Ins. Prac. Sec. 1988) [hereinafter BOND
LITIGATION].

For the text of a Servicing Contractors Endorsement, see CNA, supra note

4.
For an analysis of the historical evolution of blanket bonds, see generally Babcock,
History of Fidelity Coverage, in THE COMMERCIAL BLANKET BOND ANNOTATED 1-6
(A.B.A. 1985); Weldy, History of FinancialInstitution Bonds, in BANKERS AND OTHER
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BLANKET BONDS 1-22 (A.B.A. 1979); Weldy, History of the
Bankers Blanket Bond with Comments on the DraftingProcess, in ANNOTATED BANKERS
BLANKET BOND 5-16 (A.B.A. Tort & Ins. Prac. Sec. 1980); Hinchey, Bankers and Savings and Loan Blanket Bonds, in Bank Insurance 1-3 (Nov. 18, 1985) (Executive Enter-
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This Article creates a prototype for analyzing a complex claim
under the Bankers Blanket Bond.6 Unless otherwise indicated, the
Standard Form No. 24, revised in 1980, is the bond form that this
Article analyzes. 7 Although this is accomplished within the framework of loss relating to the acts and omissions of a servicing contractor, the same methodology applies to any loss that is arguably
covered by any insuring clause in such a bond. Section II of this
Article briefly analyzes the insuring provisions in the standard
Bankers Blanket Bond.8 To avoid antiseptic treatment, Section III
creates a hypothetical fact scenario that leads to a claim under the
Bankers Blanket Bond with a Servicing Contractors Endorsement. 9
The remainder of the Article analyzes coverage issues arising from
the conjunction of the hypothetical facts and the bond's insuring
clauses. Each insuring clause that arguably provides coverage is
analyzed separately.' 0 Although this approach may raise as many
prises, Inc. seminar material) [hereinafter Hinchey]; History and Development, supra
note 3.
6. This Article also will discuss why strict construction of the coverage provisions
and exclusions in the Bankers Blanket Bond is essential to deter financial institutions
from engaging in easily avoided loss-producing conduct. Given that decisions construing
blanket bond coverage disputes rarely address public policy, a description of the underlying functions served by the bond's various insuring agreements must, to some extent, be a
product of educated speculation.
7. Although the standard form was revised again in 1986, the 1980 form retains its
validity. Given that blanket bonds generally run continuously until cancelled by either
party or pursuant to their own terms, coverage disputes under the 1980 standard form
will be adjudicated for some time to come. Moreover, the marketing of a new form does
not necessarily supersede older forms, even with respect to underwriting accomplished
after the new form becomes available. Rather, the insurer may still issue, and the insured
may still purchase, an earlier version of the blanket bond. Cases involving the earlier
forms retain their validity to the extent that a provision remains unchanged or is revised
only stylistically. Hinchey, supra note 5. To the extent that older cases rejected the
insurer's position because of the absence of a provision in the policy, and such a provision
is thereafter inserted, the insurer should rely on the older cases and the revised form in
support of denying coverage. By the same token, if the coverage dispute arises under the
older form, the insured may rely on older case law and changes in the 1986 form to
support its coverage claim.
8. See infra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 19-36 and accompanying text.
10. Section IV analyzes the on premises insuring agreement. See infra notes 37-101
and accompanying text. Section V analyzes the forgery or alteration insuring agreement.
See infra notes 102-24 and accompanying text. Section VI analyzes the securities insuring agreement. See infra notes 125-44 and accompanying text. Section VII deals with
the Servicing Contractors Endorsement. See infra notes 145-54 and accompanying text.
Section VIII considers several subsidiary issues that affect coverage and the amount of
reimbursement due from the bonding company if coverage is found to exist. See infra
notes 155-69 and accompanying text. Section IX concludes this Article by considering
the theme of the bond and its relationship to the bond's deterrent function. See infra
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questions as answers, it will illuminate an area of insurance law
that has, until now, remained largely in the shadows.
II.

COVERAGE UNDER THE BOND:

IN GENERAL

The Bankers Blanket Bond combines separate insurance contracts into one instrument." Originally, the coverage each insuring clause provided was found in a separate policy, and each policy
was often issued by a different insurer. 12 Combined coverage has
advantages for both the insurer and the insured. From the insured's perspective, combination fosters administrative ease and a
concomitant reduction in transaction costs because all standard
protection may be purchased at one time from the same bonding
company and through the same broker. From the insurer's perspective, a blanket bond assures that it will receive all underwriting
premiums from a single financial institution, at least for the type of
3
coverage the bond provides.'
The Bankers Blanket Bond has six separate insuring agreements:
fidelity; on premises; in transit; forgery or alteration; securities; and
counterfeit currency. Additional insuring agreements, such as a
Servicing Contractors Endorsement, may be purchased for an extra premium and added to the bond in the form of riders or
endorsements.
The fidelity clause covers loss caused by the fraud or dishonesty
of an insured's employees.I4 The on premises clause covers loss to
notes 170-71 and accompanying text. In each of these sections, the concept of proximate
cause is prominently addressed.
11. J. APPLEMAN, supra note 5, § 5701, at 379. The blanket bond is a form of first
party insurance that "reimburses the insured for losses which he incurs as a result of
injury to himself or damage to property which the insured owned or leased at the time
the damage took place." B. OSTRAGER & T. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE
COVERAGE DISPUTES § 10.12, at 291 (1988). This may be contrasted with third party
liability insurance, which indemnifies the insured only for sums that he becomes legally
obligated to pay others. A. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 6.05, at 29899 (2d ed. 1988). See also Johnston, Gassmann & Hockenburg, Directors and Officers'
Liability Insurance and Related Forms of Coverage for FinancialInstitutions, in INSURANCE COVERAGE AND PRACTICE J-24 to J-34 (D.R.I. 1988).
12.

See J. APPLEMAN, supra note 5, at 375-76.

13. See id. at 376-77.
14. The fidelity clause, which the blanket bond denominates as Insuring Agreement
(A), covers:
Loss resulting directly from dishonest or fraudulent acts of an Employee committed alone or in collusion with others. Dishonest or fraudulent acts as used in
this Insuring Agreement shall mean only dishonest or fraudulent acts committed by such Employee with the manifest intent
(a) to cause the Insured to sustain such loss, and
(b) to obtain financial benefit for the Employee or for any other person or
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property of the insured caused by theft or false pretenses occurring
on its premises.15 The in transit clause compensates an insured for
loss of property sustained while the property is being transported
to or from the insured by messenger.I 6 The insuring clauses relating to forgery, alteration, and securities cover loss caused by reliance on specified categories of documents that are forged, altered,
lost, stolen, or counterfeit.' 7 The counterfeit currency clause covers loss caused by reliance on counterfeit United States or Canadian currency.' 8
There is only one methodology for analyzing bond coverage: the
facts underlying a financial institution's loss must be juxtaposed
against the provisions set forth in each insuring clause of the bond.
This may seem simple and, if coverage is clearly absent, it is. If
coverage is arguably present, however, the apparent simplicity frequently vanishes and is replaced by a coverage conundrum. When
this occurs, an educated prediction, rather than a definitive conclusion, is often the most that may be achieved.
III.

THE HYPOTHETICAL FACT SCENARIO

Happyvale National Bank ("Happyvale") is a small financial institution located in Wayne, New Jersey. Happyvale is run by President Paul Pokey and Executive Vice President Brett Markstone.
organization intended by the Employee to receive such benefit, other than
salaries, commissions, fees, bonuses, promotions, awards, profit sharing,
pensions or other employee benefits earned in the normal course of
employment.
BOND LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 9.
15. For a detailed analysis of the on premises insuring clause, denominated Insuring
Agreement (B), see infra notes 37-65 and accompanying text.
16. The in transit clause, denominated Insuring Agreement (C), covers:
Loss of Property resulting directly from robbery, common-law or statutory larceny, theft, misplacement, mysterious unexplainable disappearance, being lost
or otherwise made away with, and damage thereto or destruction thereof, while
the Property is in the custody of a person designated by the Insured to act as its
messenger (or a person acting as messenger or custodian during an emergency
arising from the incapacity of such designated messenger) and while the Property is in transit anywhere, such transit to begin immediately upon receipt of
such Property by said messenger and to end immediately upon delivery to the
designated recipient or its agent.
BOND LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 9.
17. For a detailed analysis of these insuring clauses, denominated Insuring Agreements (D) and (E), see infra notes 102-44 and accompanying text.
18. The counterfeit currency clause, denominated Insuring Agreement (F), covers
"[l]oss resulting directly from the receipt by the Insured, in good faith, of any Counterfeit
or altered Money of the United States of America or Canada." BOND LITIGATION, supra
note 5, at 9.
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Pokey, who is also Chairman of the Board of Directors, previously
made all major decisions, while Markstone, who worked his way
up from junior teller, merely carried them out. Some time ago,
however, Markstone started to exercise substantial discretion,
while Pokey began spending most of his time looking for the business instead of running it. Although Pokey's ambitions always
have exceeded his abilities, he firmly believes that a high ratio of
ambition to ability is what made this country great.' 9 In any event,
Pokey always thought that when he purchased insurance, he adequately protected the bank from loss caused by thieves and scoundrels whose base intent eluded even his remarkable abilities as a
judge of human character.
Tony "The Duck" Valentino, whose real name was Bronislav
Korcynsky, was a local "wheeler-dealer" who conducted most of
his business through his wholly-owned corporation, the Star-Spangled Funding Corporation ("Star-Spangled Funding"). Given his
preference for the histrionic, plus additional reasons that need not
be referenced, Korcynsky changed his name some time ago:
He saw below his own image, but he was no longer a clumsy,
dark, gray bird, ugly and ungainly. He was himself a swan! It
does not matter in the least having been born in a duckyard, if
only you come out of a swan's egg!20
When asked by Pokey and Markstone why he was known as "The
Duck," Valentino replied that it was because he was such a good
swimmer:
There once was a fellow named Duck,
Who found himself plum out of luck.
He became quite mendacious,
His name was fallacious
'Cause honest guys can't make a buck. 2
In 1980 and 1981, Happyvale purchased home improvement
19. Pokey may have mistaken a conditioned response for a causal connection. Simply because his own ambitions exceeded his abilities and he achieved a measure of success, he assumed that the former ratio caused the latter result. For a contrary view, see
Soshyet, Falling Rats at Law Firms, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 24, 1988, at 13, col. 1. Issues of
causation are integral to proper coverage analysis under the blanket bond. See infra notes
57-65 and accompanying text.
20.

H.C. ANDERSEN, The Ugly Duckling, in ANDERSEN'S FAIRY TALES 70, 81 (Lu-

cas & Paull translation 1945).
21. This limerick, written by Paul Pokey himself, and needlepointed by his wife in
red, white, and blue, is now framed and hangs on his office wall. It was placed there to
act as a constant reminder of what may happen when those whose ambitions exceed their
abilities become wedged between the rock of a swindler and the hard place of an insurance company.
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loans2 2 from Valentino. Happyvale serviced the loans itself for two
reasons. First, Pokey was not then willing to rely on the representations or abilities of The Duck. Second, Happyvale had not at
that time purchased a Servicing Contractors Endorsement from its
bonding company. 23 Pokey entered into these limited transactions,
in which a total loss would be relatively inconsequential, because
he hoped to determine The Duck's reliability and thereby decide
whether to expand their relationship. The loans that Happyvale
purchased were nearing maturity at the time of sale and each was
subsequently paid in full over its remaining term or prepaid in full
prior to expiration. As a result, Pokey became favorably impressed
with The Duck and decided that an expanded relationship would
indeed be propitious.
During the autumn of 1981, Pokey and The Duck held detailed
discussions regarding the proposed expansion of their relationship.
Valentino advised that he would soon obtain title to hundreds of
home improvement promissory notes and would be willing to sell
them to Happyvale. As negotiations continued, Pokey and The
Duck agreed to several terms and conditions. Happyvale would
have the option of purchasing an eighty percent participation interest in each home improvement loan.24 With respect to each loan
Happyvale purchased, Valentino would assign to Happyvale the
corresponding promissory note and mortgage. Valentino would
repay to Happyvale, on a monthly basis and over the term of each
underlying loan, the eighty percent purchase price, plus sixteen
percent interest per annum. This obligation would endure regardless of whether the homeowners met their underlying obligations to
22.

See generally Ryan, Interbank Problems: Buying Participationsand Sharing Set-

offs, in 4 ALI-ABA RESOURCE MATERIALS - BANKING AND COMMERCIAL LENDING
LAW 355 (1983); P. Schmelzer & R. Chamness, A BANKER'S GUIDE TO LOAN PARTICIPATIONS (American Bankers Ass'n 1986); Hansford & Sowell, Loan Participationsand

the UCC, 106 BANKING L.J. 62 (1989); Hoberman & Schwartz, Loan Participations:Proceed With Caution, - NEW JERSEY LAWYER 18 (1988); Simpson, Loan Participations:
Pitfallsfor Participants,31 Bus. LAW. 1977 (1976); Note, Security Interests in Notes and
Mortgages:Determining the Applicable Law, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1414 (1979). Although
much of the legal literature dealing with loan participations involves huge transactions in
which a "lead bank" sells participation interests to other banks, the principles referenced
in this Article apply with full effect, and the author believes that a more personalized and
less grandiose fact pattern will more effectively convey the essential messages.
23. Without a Servicing Contractors Endorsement, Pokey did not believe that Happyvale had coverage for losses that might occur if Valentino serviced the loans. For a
detailed analysis of the Servicing Contractors Endorsement, see infra notes 145-54 and
accompanying text.
24. In other words, the purchase price would be 80% of the amount of the underlying loan.
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Star-Spangled Funding. Valentino would service all loans for Happyvale. In exchange for his services, The Duck would earn the
difference between Happyvale's sixteen percent return and the interest rate that the homeowner-borrowers; paid, which ranged from
seventeen to twenty percent. Finally, in the event that a homeowner defaulted or Happyvale sent notice of termination, Valentino would repurchase all outstanding participation interests. The
Duck made all of his representations verbally in Happyvale's offices and behind closed doors because he preferred not to communicate by telephone or to appear in public places. Neither Pokey
nor Markstone asked him about his aversion to telephones or
crowds.
The home improvement loans were made to homeowners of relatively modest means and were memorialized in a form of promissory note known as a "Home Improvement Loan Installment
Contract." The term of each loan was often as long as five to ten
years, with an annual interest rate of seventeen to twenty percent.
Consequently, the total finance charge would often exceed the
amount of the loan. Each homeowner was required to repay the
same amount each month over the term of the loan. 25 Each installment contract recited on its face the name and address of the
homeowner, the amount and term of the loan, the annual interest
rate, the dollar amount of the finance charge over the full term, the
total sales price,26 and the amount that the borrower was obligated
to repay per month." As collateral securing his promissory note,
the homeowner would assign his mortgage to Star-Spangled Funding, with the face amount of the assignment being the same as the
amount of the loan.
By December 1981, President Pokey was ready to move ahead.
First, he switched bonding companies, contracting with South
Brook Casualty Company ("South Brook"). South Brook issued
to Happyvale a Bankers Blanket Bond along with a Servicing Contractors Endorsement. This endorsement covered loss caused by
the fraud or dishonesty of a servicing contractor and loss of funds
25. Except for their longer terms and higher interest rates, the home improvement
loans were similar to automobile financing contracts.
26. The total sales price is the sum of the amount of the loan and the finance charge.
27. To cite an example in which an amortization formula has not been applied, assume a homeowner borrowed $10,000 to build a duck pond and the interest rate on the
loan was 20% per year over a five-year term. Since 20% of $10,000 x 5 = $10,000, the
total finance charge would be $10,000 and the total sales price ($10,000 loan + $10,000
finance charge) would be $20,000. As the term of the loan was 60 months, the borrower
would pay $333.33 each month for five years.
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caused by a servicing contractor's failure to remit collected monies
to the insured, whether or not such failure involved fraud.2 The
bond became effective at 12:01 a.m., New Jersey time, on January
1, 1982.
President Pokey also instructed Happyvale's lawyer, Evan Scoter, to draft a contract incorporating Pokey's recollection of the
terms and conditions previously discussed with The Duck. Scoter
also incorporated the following provisions into the contract: (i)
Happyvale would have the right to examine the originals of all
back-up documents before purchasing participation interests; 29 (ii)
Happyvale would have the continuing right to examine all related
books, records, and documents in the custody or control of StarSpangled Funding; (iii) all promissory notes were owned by StarSpangled Funding free and clear of any encumbrances or liens;
and, (iv) no homeowners had been delinquent in repaying their
loans to The Duck.
Scoter made only one mistake and it was a big one. Instead of
providing that Happyvale would purchase eighty percent of the
amount loaned to each homeowner, the contract he drafted provided that Happyvale would purchase eighty percent of the "total
sales price" of each loan.30 Happyvale thus purchased a percentage of the entire amount loaned, plus the finance charge. This
oversight was not discovered prior to execution. The contract, denominated a "Home Improvement Loan Participation Agreement," was signed by Pokey and The Duck at Happyvale's
headquarters at 12:00 noon on January 1, 1982. Immediately after
execution, two things happened. First, Happyvale purchased its
first package of loans from Star-Spangled Funding, paying The
Duck eighty percent of the total sales price of each loan. Second,
The Duck made off with Pokey's fountain pen.
Earlier that morning, President Pokey had quickly examined all
back-up documents and concluded that they were in order. He did
not have his lawyer examine them and did not cause an investigation to be conducted into the creditworthiness of Valentino, StarSpangled Funding, or the homeowners. Thereafter, on the first
day of each month from February to October 1982, Happyvale
28. The Servicing Contractors Endorsement first came into use in 1956. Prior to that
time, such coverage was provided, if at all, under a separate policy. Hudson City Sav.
Inst. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 440 F. Supp. 41, 43 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
29. The back-up documents comprised the promissory notes and mortgage
assignments.
30. As a result of this situation, The Duck would necessarily owe more money to
Happyvale than he could possibly receive from the homeowner-borrowers.
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purchased additional packages of loans from The Duck. At the
time of each purchase, The Duck came to the bank and received a
cashier's check from Pokey representing the purchase price of the
i
package of loans.
Vice President Markstone, having been on extended leave, was
not involved in the preparation or execution of the contract. When
he returned to Happyvale in March 1982, Markstone was dismayed to learn that Pokey had entered into a long-term contract
with The Duck. Markstone knew that Pokey had developed a reputation for paying less than scrupulous attention to detail. At
Markstone's insistence, Pokey had promised to await the vice president's return before contracting with The Duck. But, when Valentino suggested that he might take his business elsewhere unless
the deal closed by the first of the year, Pokey decided that he could
not afford to look a gift duck in the bill. So, Pokey signed on the
dotted line.
In Markstone's absence, Happyvale had purchased three packages of loans, at all times adhering to the formula set forth in the
January 1, 1982 contract. Upon returning to Happyvale in midMarch and reviewing the relevant documents, Markstone at once
realized that Happyvale had inadvertently purchased a percentage
of the total sales price, rather than the amount of each loan. Because Valentino was supposedly receiving only seventeen to twenty
percent interest from each homeowner on the amount of each loan,
while at the same time remitting to Happyvale sixteen percent interest on the total sales price - which itself was often twice the
amount of each loan - this necessarily meant that a substantial
portion of the funds received by Happyvale came from a source
other than the homeowners. Nonetheless, neither Pokey nor
Markstone appeared suspicious and neither one inquired into the
source of these phantom funds. They purported to be concerned
only that Happyvale was under-collateralized because each mortgage assignment was in the face amount of each loan, rather than
the total sales price of the loan.
Before Markstone would authorize Happyvale to purchase a
fourth package of loans, he convened a meeting at the bank attended by Pokey, Valentino, and Scoter. He instructed Scoter to
prepare a new contract providing for the purchase of eighty percent of the amount of each loan, advising The Duck in no uncertain terms that all subsequent loans would be purchased on the
basis of this new calculation. The Duck agreed. The new contract
was executed on the morning of April 1, 1982, and later that day,
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Happyvale purchased its fourth package of loans from Star-Spangled Funding. President Pokey evidently believed that the first
three packages of loans were reformed to become consistent with
the originally intended formula expressed in the revised contract.
This was not the case. In the first three transactions, Happyvale
continued to receive sixteen percent interest on its eighty percent
investment in the total sales price of each loan until October 1983,
when disaster struck.
On October 30, 1983, Star-Spangled Funding failed to remit any
money to Happyvale. After repeated efforts to telephone The
Duck proved unsuccessful, Markstone went to Star-Spangled
Funding's office, only to discover that it was a padlocked warehouse in a rather disreputable section of town. No one from the
bank had previously visited the site or enforced the bank's contractual right to examine the company's records.
Happyvale immediately proceeded to superior court and sought
to attach all assets of Valentino and Star-Spangled Funding. The
bank also sought an order requiring that all homeowners tender
their payments directly to Happyvale. This relief was granted on
default and Happyvale promptly advised all homeowners to make
payments directly to the bank. At the same time, it provided notice of claim to South Brook under its Bankers Blanket Bond.31
After the court order was signed, Markstone gained admission
31. Section 5 of the Bankers Blanket Bond is entitled "NOTICE/PROOF-LEGAL
PROCEEDINGS," and is subsumed under the generic category of "CONDITIONS
AND LIMITATIONS." It provides:
(a) At the earliest practicable moment, not to exceed 30 days after discovery
of loss, the Insured shall give the Underwriter notice thereof.
(b) Within 6 months after such discovery, the Insured shall furnish to the
Underwriter proof of loss, duly sworn to, with full particulars.
(c) Lost Securities listed in a proof of loss shall be identified by certificate or
bond numbers if the Securities were issued therewith.
(d) Legal proceedings for the recovery of any loss hereunder shall not be
brought prior to the expiration of 60 days after the original proof of loss is filed
with the Underwriter or after the expiration of 24 months from the discovery of
such loss, except that any action or proceeding to recover hereunder on account
of any judgment against the Insured . . . or to recover attorney's fees paid in
such suit, shall be brought within 24 months from the date upon which the
judgment and such suit shall become final.
(e) If any limitation embodied in this bond is prohibited by any law controlling the construction hereof, such limitation shall be deemed to be amended so
as to equal the minimum period of limitation provided by such law.
(f) This bond affords coverage only in favor of the Insured. No suit, action or
legal proceedings shall be brought hereunder by anyone other than the named
Insured.
Bond Litigation, supra note 5, at 11. See generally DESKBOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN INSURANCE LAW 297-300 (2d ed. 1988).
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to The Duck's offices. Three things disturbed him: first, all the
utilities had been shut off; second, the files were strewn all over the
office; and third, a foul odor was coming from what turned out to
be a dead fish wrapped in a newspaper:
There was a little man, and he had a little gun,
And his bullets were made of lead, lead, lead;
He went to the brook, and saw a little duck,
And shot it through the head, head, head.32
Given these circumstances, Happyvale required an extension of
time in which to file its particularized proof of loss,3 3 and South
Brook consented under a full reservation of rights.3 4
32. J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 933 (15th ed. 1980).
33. Blanket bonds typically require that the insured must provide notice of a claim to
the insurer as soon as practicable after discovery, but in no event exceeding 30 days
thereafter, and that a sworn proof of loss with full particulars must be submitted within
six months after discovery of the loss. See supra note 31. Standard Form No. 24, as
revised in 1980 and 1986, contains these requirements. The 1969 form, however, requires
notice as soon as practicable, but does not require that such notice be provided within any
specified number of days after the insured discovers the loss. BOND LITIGATION, supra
note 5, at 4-5. The discovery clause in the 1980 version of Standard Form No. 24
provides:
This bond applies to loss discovered by the Insured during the bond period.
Discovery occurs when the Insured becomes aware of facts which would cause
a reasonable person to assume that a loss covered by the bond has been or will
be incurred, even though the exact amount or details of loss may not then be
known. Notice to the Insured of an actual or potential claim by a third party
which alleges that the Insured is liable under circumstances which, if true,
would create a loss under this bond constitutes such discovery.
Id. at 11.
The term "discovery," as used in the blanket bond, has been the subject of much debate. See generally First Sec. Say. v. Kansas Bankers Sur. Co., 849 F.2d 345 (8th Cir.
1988); Royal Trust Bank v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 788 F.2d 719 (11 th Cir. 1986);
Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 748 F.2d 118, 121-24 (2d Cir. 1984);
USLife Say. & Loan Ass'n v. National Sur. Corp., 115 Cal. App. 3d 336, 345, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 393, 398 (2d Dist. 1981); Allied Bank Int'l v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 11, 1988, at 18, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County); Clore, Rights of Recovery of Banks
Against Sureties, Insurers and Officers and Directorsin the 1980"s, in BOND LITIGATION,
supra note 5, at 33-88; Woods, Conditions to Recovery: Notice, Proofof Loss and Timeliness of Filing Suit, in BANKERS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BLANKET BONDS
391 (A.B.A. 1979); Devin & David, Discovery Under FidelityBonds: The Emerging Concept of the Insured'sDuty of Inquiry, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 543 (1986); Note, The Problem
of an Insured Delaying Notice to an Insurer of a Claim Against the Insurer: A Problem
with Presumed Prejudice, 22 VAL. U.L. REV. 461 (1988).
34. If a surety reserves its rights when granting an extension of time to file a proof of
loss, the surety thereby reserves the right to later deny coverage on the ground that the
insured failed to provide notification of loss within 30 days of discovery. For a general
analysis of the effects of an insurer's reservation of rights, see R. KEETON & A. WIDISS,
supra note 1, at 704-12; B. OSTRAGER & T. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 2.02, at 32-34 (1988); Herman, Guidelinesfor Reservation of Rights!
Denial of Coverage, in INSURANCE COVERAGE AND PRACTICE m-l (D.R.I. 1988); Wall,
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After organizing Valentino's files and conducting his own investigation, Markstone concluded that one-half of the loans purchased
by Happyvale were uncollectible for several reasons. First, some
were prepaid in full during the several months prior to The Duck's
disappearance. Second, others were sold to two or more financial
institutions and, to the extent that the underlying borrowers were
not delinquent, they had been making payments directly to the
other banks. Third, some homeowners had evidently signed the
notes and mortgage assignments in blank and then decided not to
borrow money, whereupon The Duck filled in the blanks without
consent and sold the paper to Happyvale. Finally, many homeowners had been chronically delinquent in meeting their contractual obligations, some having never made any payments at all.
After reaching these conclusions, Happyvale submitted a proof
of loss affidavit to South Brook seeking to recover $1,000,000
under the Servicing Contractors Endorsement to its Bankers Blanket Bond. This amount represented the remaining principal and
interest due on these defective loans. 35 As for The Duck, his
whereabouts continued to remain a mystery:
Litigation and Prevention of InsurerBad Faith § 3.04, at 26-28 (1985 & Supp. 1988). See
also Metzner, Late Notice and Misrepresentation,in INSURANCE, ExcESS, AND REINSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES 371 (Practicing Law Institute 1989); Comment, Reservation

of Rights Notices and Nonwaiver Agreements, 12 PAC. L.J. 763 (1981). South Brook
should reserve its right to deny coverage on the ground that Happyvale discovered the
loss in March 1982. Given that a reasonable person would expect to sustain loss upon
learning that a substantial portion of the funds remitted by The Duck did not come from
the homeowners, South Brook's argument should succeed. Happyvale was placed on
constructive notice of this fact upon first receiving payments from Valentino because
principal plus 16% interest on the total sales price could not have been derived from
principal plus 17% to 20% interest on the amount financed. Happyvale had actual notice of potential loss in March 1982, when Markstone became aware of the discrepancy.
Under traditional agency principles, his knowledge would be imputed to the bank. City
State Bank in Wellington v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 778 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir.
1985); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Hartley, 275 F. Supp. 610 (M.D. Ga. 1967),
aff'd without op., 389 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1968); West Am. Fin. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co.,
17 Cal. App. 2d 225, 61 P.2d 963 (1936); Heake v. Atlantic Casualty Ins. Co., 415 N.J.
475, 482, 105 A.2d 526, 529-30 (1954). See Windt, Insurance Claims and Disputes § 1.02,
at 4 n.ll (2d ed. 1988). But see Home Life Ins. Co. v. Clay, 11 Kan. App. 2d 280, 719
P.2d 756 (1986) (eighteen-month delay in notice after learning of check forgery did not
entitle insurer to summary judgment because injured third party advised the bank that it
would not sue to recover its loss). Clay adheres more to equity than to the terms of the
bond's discovery clause.
35. Experience indicates that most insureds seek coverage under only one insuring
agreement. Arguably, this is due in part to their overly simplistic understanding of the
coverage afforded by the bond. For example, Happyvale sought coverage only under the
Servicing Contractors Endorsement because it believed its loss was caused by Valentino,
and Valentino was a servicing contractor. President Pokey failed to realize that Valentino was also a seller of promissory notes, an assignor of collateral, and perhaps a bor-
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Always do that, wild ducks do. They shoot to the bottom, sir and bite themselves fast in the tangle and seaweed - and all the
devil's own mess that grows down there. And they never come
up again. 36

Ten months later, Valentino did come up again. His body washed
up on the banks of the Raritan in New Brunswick. Upon reading
the headline in the next day's newspaper - "Gangland Slaying
Turns River into Duck Soup" - Pokey turned to Markstone and
asked: "Do you think The Duck lied to us about being a good
swimmer too?"
rower. Therefore, the loss Valentino caused might be covered under Insuring
Agreements (B), (D), or (E).
Experience also reveals that insureds tend to focus on a single insuring agreement because of the way many carriers format their proofs of loss. With respect to the cause of
loss, these forms often contain boxes that must be checked off. Each box corresponds to a
separate insuring agreement. This appears to suggest to the insured that it may seek
coverage only under one insuring agreement. The sophisticated insured will simply check
off every box or describe the facts and refrain from characterizing the claim so that it
would clearly fall within the scope of only one insuring clause. Alternatively, the insured
may seek coverage under "each and every portion of the bond that provides coverage for
the loss." The insurer may object on the ground that the insured bears the burden of
establishing its entitlement to coverage, notwithstanding the fact that the insurer unilaterally drafted the contract and should be more knowledgeable about its meaning. A.
WINDT, supra note 11, § 6.27, at 277. See generally Wright v. Newman, 598 F. Supp.
1178 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd, 767 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1985); Crawford v. Ranger Ins. Co.,
653 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1981); Hale v. Fawcett, 214 Va. 583, 586, 202 S.E.2d 923, 925
(1974); 13 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 5, § 7381 at 1-23; W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, supra
note 2, § 20.16, at 64243 (3d ed. 1978); Howard, Apportioning an Insurer's Liability
Between Covered and Noncovered Partiesand Claims, 38 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q.
319, 324 (1988). Although the policyholder bears the burden of establishing coverage, if
a carrier is concerned about both its reputation among customers and how courts will
perceive it in future coverage litigation, it should treat every claim as potentially arising
under the entire bond and analyze coverage accordingly.
Even when the person responsible for a loss acts solely as a servicing contractor, the
sophisticated insured will often attempt to place coverage under an insuring agreement in
the standard form because the limit of liability under the Servicing Contractors Endorsement is typically lower than the limit for standard insuring agreements. See, e.g., Hudson
City Say. Inst. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 440 F. Supp. 41 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
36. H. IBSEN, The Wild Duck, in FOUR PLAYS OF HENRIK IBSEN 157 (1947).
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IV.

COVERAGE UNDER INSURING AGREEMENT (B):
' 37
"ON PREMISES

A.

The "On Premises" Insuring Clause38

For purposes of analyzing Happyvale's claim, Insuring Clause
(B) (the "on premises" clause) provides coverage for loss of property directly caused by a person's false pretenses while that person
is on the insured's premises. 39 The Bankers Blanket Bond defines
property to include money.'0 Although the term "directly" is not
defined, its appearance in each of the standard form's insuring
agreements, in conjunction with related exclusions, 4 ' indicates that
37. Insuring Agreement (A), the Fidelity Insuring Agreement, provides coverage for
"[loss resulting directly from dishonest or fraudulent acts of an [e]mployee" of the
insured. See supra note 14. Because neither Valentino nor Star-Spangled Funding was
an employee of Happyvale, Insuring Agreement (A) is not implicated in this
hypothetical. But see Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Watson, 75 F.2d 749, 753 (8th
Cir. 1935) (person hired by bank to perform discrete task deemed an "employee" for
purpose of invoking coverage provisions of Insuring Clause (A)).
This is not to say Insuring Clause (A) is irrelevant. It defines dishonesty and fraud in
terms virtually identical to those used to define the same terms in the Servicing
Contractors Endorsement. See supra note 14. See also infra note 145. Given the sparsity
of case law interpreting the Servicing Contractors Endorsement, courts should look to
cases decided under Insuring Clause (A) to interpret dishonesty and fraud as used in this
rider.
38. Insuring Agreement (B) covers:
(1) Loss of Property resulting directly from
(a) robbery, burglary, misplacement, mysterious unexplainable disappearance and
damage thereto or destruction thereof, or
(b) theft, false pretenses, common law or statutory larceny, committed by a person
present in an office or on the premises of the Insured, while the Property is lodged or
deposited within offices or premises located anywhere.
(2) Loss of or damage to
(a) furnishings, fixtures, supplies or equipment within an office of the Insured
covered under this bond resulting directly from larceny or theft in, or by burglary or
robbery of, such office, or attempt thereat, or by vandalism or malicious mischief, or
(b) such office resulting from larceny or theft in, or by burglary or robbery of such
office or attempt there at, or to the interior of such office by vandalism or malicious
mischief, provided that
(i) the Insured is the owner of such furnishings, fixtures, supplies, equipment, or
office or is liable for such loss or damage, and
(ii) the loss is not caused by fire.
BOND LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 9.
39. See Annotation, Insurance of Bank Against Larceny and False Pretenses, 15
A.L.R.2D 1006 (1951).
40. BOND LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 10.
41. In the 1980 version of Standard Form No. 24, Exclusion (u) eliminates coverage
for "damages of any type for which the insured is legally liable, except direct compensatory damages arising from a loss covered under this bond." Id. at 11. Exclusion (w)
eliminates coverage for "indirect or consequential loss of any nature." Id. These exclusions have remained essentially the same in the 1986 financial institution bond, although
they are re-lettered. Id. at 16.
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the causal connection between a loss and the loss-producing act
must be of a highly proximate nature for coverage to be present.4 2
As with the term "directly," the bond does not define "false pretenses," and courts that have construed the term do not always
adopt a consistent approach. For example, in ClarendonBank and
Trust v. Fidelity and Deposit Co.,43 the court defined false pretenses
to be identical to fraud. The court in Merchants-ProduceBank v.
42. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Barber, 70 F.2d 220, 222-24 (6th Cir.
1934); Hinckson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 232, 146 Cal. Rptr. 669,
671-72 (1978); American Sur. Co. v. Capitol Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 97 Colo. 510, 515, 50
P.2d 792, 794 (1935); Employers Liab. Assurance Co. v. State, 110 Ind. App. 86, 92-94,
34 N.E.2d 936, 938 (1941); Basset, DirectLoss Under the Fidelity InsuringAgreement of
the FinancialInstitution Bond, 54 DEF. COUNS. J. 487 (1987); Crowder & Thompson, On
Premises Coverage, in BANKERS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BLANKET BONDS
105 (A.B.A. 1979); Curran, Causation and the Bankers Blanket Bond, 19 FORUM 129
(1983); Kruger & Sorenson, Causation in Fidelity Cases, 12 FORUM 420 (1976); Kruger,
Conditionsto Recovery: Loss and Causation, in BANKERS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BLANKET BONDS 337-39 (1979); Kruger, Loss and Causation, in ANNOTATED
BANKERS BLANKET BOND 43 (A.B.A. Tort & Ins. Prac. Sec. 1980 & Supp. 1983); Moran, Loss and Causation, in THE COMMERCIAL BLANKET BOND ANNOTATED 23
(A.B.A. 1985); Withers, Proximate Cause and Multiple Causation in First-PartyInsurance Cases, 20 FORUM 256 (1985).
Sometimes the causation issue is fairly simple. For example, in Allen State Bank v.
Traveler's Indemnity Co., 270 So. 2d 270 (La. App. 1972), the bank loaned money to a
customer and thereafter obtained security to collateralize the loan. Id. at 271. The customer defaulted and the security turned out to be forged and worthless. Id. at 272. The
bank sought recovery under the insuring agreement in its blanket bond that provided
coverage for loss caused by reliance on forged instruments. Id. at 271-72. The court
denied coverage because the bank had not relied on the collateral as a precondition to
advancing funds. In denying coverage, the court stated:
The bond is not a policy of credit insurance and does not protect the bank when
it simply makes a bad business deal. The real cause of the loss sustained by [the
bank] in this case was [the borrower's] failure to repay the loan and not any
fraud perpetrated on the bank at the time the loan was made. Had the assigned
notes been pledged at the time of and as an incident and requirement of the
loans, and fraud shown on the part of [the borrower] in connection therewith,
then of course, the bank would be protected, at least under Clause (E).
Id. at 273-74. See also Liberty Nat'l Bank v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 568 F. Supp.
860 (D.N.J. 1983) (no coverage because even though the assigned certificates of deposit
had forged signatures, the fact that the underlying assets did not exist is what directly
caused the loss); Columbia Union Nat'l Bank v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 496 F.
Supp. 1263 (W.D. Mo. 1980), aff'd, 669 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1982) (no coverage because
the bank had knowledge of false pretenses at the time it sustained the loss); Continental
Bank v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 909, 101 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972)
(no coverage because even though the bank received forged financial statement before
making the loan, it would have made the loan anyway and therefore did not rely on the
financial statement); Texas Nat'l Bank of Dallas v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 526
S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976) (no coverage when collateral is pledged after the loan is
made).
43. 406 F. Supp. 1161, 1167 (E.D. Va. 1975). See also Columbia Union Nat'l Bank,
496 F. Supp. at 1274.
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United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.," however, purposely refrained from defining the term, reasoning that an individual's ability to devise novel and illicit schemes was so great that no single
definition should limit it.45
Despite these different interpretations, it is evident that the term
"false pretenses" was intended to connote some form of misrepresentation. 6 Therefore, to obtain coverage under the on premises
insuring clause, Happyvale must first establish that it lost money as
a direct result of one or more misrepresentations made by The
Duck while he was on the bank's premises.
Coverage Under the On Premises Insuring Clause
In the event that a Bankers Blanket Bond claim falls within an
exclusion, the exclusion eliminates coverage that otherwise exists.47
An exclusion does not turn a covered claim into a non-covered
claim. It is appropriate, therefore, to first consider coverage under
the on premises insuring clause without taking the bond's exclusions into account. Only to the extent that coverage is arguably
provided should the exclusions then be analyzed.
At the outset, it appears that Happyvale should be covered
under the on premises clause. Valentino concealed the fact that he
filled in blanks on promissory notes and mortgage assignments
without authority. He also falsely represented that none of the
homeowners were chronically delinquent in repaying their loans,
and that Star-Spangled Funding owned the obligations when, in
fact, they had already been assigned to other banks. But for these
misrepresentations that Valentino made on the bank's premises,
Happyvale would not have entered into the loss-producing transactions. Stated more simply: Had Pokey known The Duck was a
B.

44. 305 F. Supp. 957 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
45. Id. at 966.
46. The words in an insurance policy are to be construed according to the way a
reasonable lay person would interpret them. See Howard, D&O Insurance Through the
Looking-Glass." An Attitudinal Primer,38 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 163, 172 n.28
(1988). For this reason, when a term is not defined in the insurance contract, a court will
often consider its dictionary definition in the hope of thereby approximating its ordinary
and common meaning. Silverman & Lane, Rules of Construction in InsurancePolicies, in
INSURANCE, ExcESS, AND REINSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES 9, 22 (Practicing Law
Institute 1989). False pretenses are defined as "[c]alculated misrepresentation[s] of fact
for purposes of fraud, as through forged documents." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DicTIONARY 488 (2d college ed. 1985). A court, therefore, may conclude that "false pretenses," as used in the Bankers Blanket Bond, refers to misrepresentations.
47. Lee & Dudnick, Directors'and Officers' Liability Insurance:Policy Exclusions, in
DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY INSURANCE 487, 493 (Practicing Law Institute
1988).
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swindler, he would have called off the deal. Although this analysis
is appealing in its simplicity, a closer examination of each category
of loss in conjunction with the concept of direct or proximate causation reveals that coverage may not exist under the on premises
insuring agreement.
1.

Loans Prepaid in Full

Coverage under the on premises clause is least likely for loss attributable to prepaid loans. Coverage is unlikely because Valentino
made no misrepresentations concerning these loans at or prior to
the time Happyvale purchased them.
Although Happyvale may claim that Valentino promised he
would prepay the bank should a borrower prepay him and that,
but for this misrepresentation Happyvale would not have
purchased any loans, its claim would fail for several reasons. First,
the entire notion of such a mirror-image prepayment obligation
conflicts with the terms of the Home Improvement Loan Participation Agreements. As indicated, these agreements required only
that Valentino pay Happyvale principal plus sixteen percent interest on a monthly basis, regardless of whether the homeowners paid
Valentino anything. Assuming that the contract contained a
merger or integration clause,4 8 the parol evidence rule would prevent Happyvale from admitting into evidence an oral understanding with Valentino that conflicted with the terms of their written
agreement.49
Even if Happyvale established that Valentino had a mirror-image prepayment obligation, coverage under the on premises clause
still may not exist. The most that Happyvale could establish is
that, but for Valentino's misrepresentations, the bank would not
48. Merger or integration clauses provide that the contract represents the entire
agreement between the contracting parties and they prohibit alteration except by another
written instrument that the same parties have executed. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
726, 892 (5th ed. 1979); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 41, at
80-81 (West 3d ed. 1970).
49. For analysis of the parol evidence rule, see J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra
note 48, § 3-1, at 132-83; A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1295, at 1065-66 (West
1952);

E. IMWINKELRIED,

HANDBOOK FOR THE TRIAL OF CONTRACT LAWSUITS:

106-11 (1981).
Happyvale might argue that the parol evidence rule is exclusively intended to protect
the parties to the contract and, therefore, should not apply in a coverage action between
the bank and its insurer. In effect, Happyvale would contend that this rule is inappropriate because it would protect South Brook, a non-party to the Home Improvement Loan
Participation Agreements. See generally Annotation, Applicability of ParolEvidence Rule
in Favor of or Against One not Party to Contract of Release, 13 A.L.R.3D 313 (1967).
STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES

1988]

Bankers Blanket Bond Coverage

have entered into the transactions and, therefore, would not have
sustained any loss. But for cause or cause in fact, however, is not
equivalent to proximate or direct cause. According to the on
premises insuring agreement, the insured must sustain loss that is
directly caused by false pretenses.50 South Brook may assert that
Valentino's false pretenses did not directly cause the loss. Instead,
it would argue that the loss was directly caused by Valentino's failure to remit collected funds to the bank or by his breach of the
Home Improvement Loan Participation Agreements. In either
event, the absence of proximate cause between Valentino's false
pretenses and Happyvale's loss would eliminate coverage under the
on premises clause for loss arising from loans prepaid in full.
2.

Promissory Notes and Mortgage Assignments
Signed in Blank

South Brook may incur exposure for the losses Happyvale sustained on the notes and mortgages the homeowners signed in
blank. Valentino caused these losses when he falsely represented
that the homeowners voluntarily entered into the home improvement loan installment contracts and that Star-Spangled Funding
held unblemished title to the paper it sold to Happyvale. Once
again, however, South Brook may argue that these misrepresentations did not directly cause Happyvale's loss.
South Brook's causation defense rests upon Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"). South Brook must assert that
Happyvale was a holder in due course of the commercial paper
signed in blank because a holder in due course may enforce such
50. BOND LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 9. Under conventional tort law, a "but for
cause," also known as a "cause in fact," is a necessary but insufficient element for establishing proximate or direct causation. Causation in fact is required to establish tort liability, but tort liability cannot exist without direct causation too. See 4 F. HARPER, F.
JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS 85-185 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1988); R. KEETON
AND A. WIDISS, supra note 1, § 5.5, at 545-63; R. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 263-321 (5th Lawyer's ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988).
Causation in contract law is a function of the parties' intent at the time the contract is
executed. In contrast to tort law, causation in contract law is supposedly divorced from
considerations such as blame, foreseeability, deterrence, and risk spreading. See, e.g.,
Barmat v. John and Jane Doe Partners, 155 Ariz. 519, 523-24, 747 P.2d 1218, 1220-21
(1987); McDowell, Foreseeability in Contract and Tort: The Problems of Responsibility
and Remoteness, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 286 (1985). In the context of financial institution bonds, this Article contends that the case law does not recognize this distinction.
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obligations against both the endorsers and makers.51 Arguably,
Happyvale's loss was caused directly by its unwillingness or inability to enforce the notes or foreclose on the mortgages.5 2 Alternatively, South Brook may argue that Happyvale's inability to
enforce the terms of the Home Improvement Loan Participation
Agreements against Star-Spangled Funding was the direct cause of
53
the loss.
51. 6 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-407, at 210 (3d
ed. 1984). Section 3-302 of the UCC provides in part:
(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against
or claim to it on the part of any person ....
5 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-302, at 484 (3d ed. 1984).
Section 3-407 of the UCC provides: "[a] subsequent holder in due course may in all
cases enforce the instrument according to its original tenor, and when an incomplete
instrument has been completed, he may enforce it as completed." 5 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-407, at 210 (3d ed. 1984). See also Adams v.
Madison Realty & Dev., Inc., 853 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1988); T. QUINN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST § 3-407, at 3-183 to 3-189 (1978 &
Supp. No. 1 1988); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 15-5, at 603-05 n.57 (2d ed. 1980); Farnsworth, Good
Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666 (1963); Summers, "Good Faith" in General ContractLaw
and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968).
52. South Brook's causation argument is based on the premise that loss under a blanket bond is what the insured gives up rather than what it fails to get back. See, e.g.,
Hartford Accident & Indem. Ins. Co. v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 638 F. Supp. 78, 8586 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (loss must consist of direct diminution of funds already in the possession of the insured); Citizens Bank of Or. v. American Ins. Co., 289 F. Supp. 211, 213-14
(D. Ore. 1968) (loss consists of diverted funds); First Thrift v. Pacific Indem. Co., 95 Cal.
App. 2d 460, 212 P.2d 560, 561 (1949) (covered loss occurs when the money to purchase
notes is paid out); Allen State Bank v. Traveler's Indem. Co., 270 So. 2d 270, 273-74 (La.
Ct. App. 1972) (no covered loss because the bank gave nothing of value and extended no
credit in exchange for the underlying notes); Eliot Sav. Bank v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co., 310 Mass. 355, 361, 38 N.E.2d 59, 63 (1941) (loss occurs when bank gives up money
for something worthless); Fitchburg Say. Bank v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 274
Mass. 135, 149-59, 174 N.E. 324, 328 (1931) (loss occurs when the funds a bank pays out
are diverted, not when the damage is sustained); Smith v. Federal Sur. Co., 60 S.D. 100,
104, 243 N.W. 664, 667 (1932) (loss is the deprivation or dispossession of money regardless of the ultimate injuries sustained); Virginia Capital Bank v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co., 231 Va. 283, 287, 343 S.E.2d 81, 84 (1986) (loss under a bond consists of value given
by bank in exchange for invalid and unenforceable promissory note); Lentz, Profit and
the PotentialIncome Exclusion, 19 FORUM 694 (1984). Given this premise, Happyvale's
insurable loss would consist, at most, only of the money it paid to Valentino as the
purchase price for the loans, offset by the principal and interest repaid prior to October
1983. Even assuming coverage, Happyvale's loss would not consist of the money it was
supposed to receive from The Duck, or indirectly from the homeowners, from October
1983 through the end of the term of the longest loan.
53. It is not absolutely certain that Happyvale would be deemed a holder in due
course or a good faith purchaser for value. A holder in due course must purchase an
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Happyvale could recover its loss under one set of circumstances.
If Happyvale established that it spent good money to purchase
worthless paper as a direct result of Valentino's false pretenses,
then it could recover. But, Happyvale did not purchase worthless
paper because it had, and still has, viable causes of action against
Valentino, Star-Spangled Funding, and the homeowners, even if
they all turn out to be judgment-proof. 4 Happyvale purchased legally enforceable obligations and, thus, may not argue that it sustained a loss at the time it purchased participation interests in the
home improvement loans. As such, it may not be said that loss
sustained by Happyvale from instruments signed in blank directly
caused its loss and the on premises insuring agreement should not,
instrument in good faith and without notice of any defenses. See 5 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-302, at 484 (3d ed. 1984). Given Happyvale's
failure to conduct an investigation prior to executing the Home Improvement Loan
Agreements and its failure to probe the source of the phantom funds that Valentino remitted, it may be argued that the bank was not a holder in due course because its conduct
failed to satisfy the preconditions of good faith, and purchasing without notice of defenses
that might be asserted by the borrowers. See Adams v. Madison Realty Dev. Inc., 853
F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1988) (bank purchasing promissory notes not a holder in due course
because the notes were endorsed on separate, unattached pages but the bank nonetheless
failed to inquire regarding this anomaly). For an analysis of good faith reliance as a
precondition to coverage under Insuring Agreement (E), see infra notes 130-40 and accompanying text. Even if Happyvale is not deemed a holder in due course because its
behavior evidenced bad faith, it will not necessarily be covered for loss caused by instruments signed in blank because an insured may not be reimbursed, through insurance or
otherwise, for the consequences of its intentional misconduct. Howard, supra note 46, at
179-80. Moreover, it is unclear whether any party to coverage litigation would willingly
argue that Happyvale was not a holder in due course. South Brook will hesitate to make
such an argument in order to preserve its proximate cause defense under the on premises
insuring clause. Happyvale will also hesitate to make such an argument to maximize the
likelihood of finding coverage under Insuring Agreement (E). See infra notes 130-40 and
accompanying text. Therefore, unless the court were willing to rule sua sponte that Happyvale was not a holder in due course, which is unlikely, it is quite possible that the issue
would never arise.
54. If Happyvale had purchased warehouse receipts purporting to represent non-existent stock, then it might validly be concluded that it paid good money for worthless
paper. In this scenario, assuming the false representations regarding the contents of the
warehouse were made on the bank's premises, coverage would arguably exist under the
on premises clause. Similarly, coverage would exist if Valentino, rather than completing
notes signed in blank without authority, had sold notes with signatures forged by a third
party. In this situation, however, coverage for the loss should exist under Insuring
Agreement (D) (forgery or alteration), rather than under the on premises clause. The
bond sets forth several parallel exclusions that, when read together, provide that if the
principal cause of a loss consists of a specific form of behavior, then the bank may seek
coverage only under the insuring clause designed to afford reimbursement for loss caused
primarily by such behavior. See infra note 57 and accompanying text. The apparent
object of these provisions is to avoid overlapping coverage and the conundrum of concurrent causation issues.
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therefore, provide coverage for such loss. 55

3.

Multiple Pledging

Whether there is coverage for loss caused by Valentino's multiple sales of the same promissory notes and mortgage assignments
depends on when the paper was sold to financial institutions other
than Happyvale. Timing is also important because it determines
whether The Duck's false pretenses were the proximate cause of
Happyvale's loss.
If the other institutions purchased the paper before Happyvale
did, then The Duck's false representation to Pokey that he owned
the notes and mortgages was arguably the direct cause of Happyvale's loss. Under these circumstances, Valentino's misrepresentations would appear to satisfy the dual requirements of cause in
fact and proximate cause. Happyvale's causation argument is
more problematic if the loans were sold to other banks after it
purchased them. In this event, The Duck's representation at the
time of purchase would not have been false and, therefore, would
not have caused Happyvale to sustain loss. Rather, as was true for
the notes and mortgages signed in blank, Happyvale would have
received precisely what it bargained for at the time it parted with
the purchase price.56 Its subsequent loss would have been caused
by three occurrences for which the on premises clause does not
provide coverage: first, Valentino's subsequent fraud; second,
Happyvale's inability or unwillingness to enforce the notes or foreclose on the mortgages; third, the bank's inability to enforce the
terms of the Home Improvement Loan Participation Agreements.
4.

Loans Made to Delinquent Borrowers

As with those loans that were pledged severally, coverage for
loans made to delinquent borrowers may depend on when each
borrower became delinquent. If The Duck sold notes to Happyvale after the homeowners defaulted on their repayments, then
the bank may argue that it would not have purchased the notes
and, therefore, would not have sustained a loss but for his
misrepresentations.
Even under this scenario, however, South Brook may have a
good coverage defense if it argues that the loss was not caused directly by Valentino's false pretenses, but rather by the homeown55. See supra notes 42, 52.
56. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
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ers' failure to fulfill their obligations after his disappearance in
October 1983. South Brook may also argue that Happyvale's loss
was caused directly by its inability or unwillingness to enforce the
notes or foreclose on the mortgages. Finally, the insurer may argue that the bank's loss was directly caused by its inability to recover from Star-Spangled Funding under the Home Improvement
Loan Participation Agreements.
Assuming that the homeowners were making timely payments
prior to Happyvale's purchase, South Brook would have a much
stronger causation defense because The Duck would not have misrepresented the status of these loans at the time of purchase. To
the contrary, he represented that he would sell participation interests in notes that were being timely repaid and he would have done
just that.
C. Proximate Cause
The foregoing analysis of Happyvale's claim reveals that South
Brook may legitimately argue that there is no coverage under the
on premises insuring clause because no loss was caused directly by
The Duck's false pretenses made on the premises of the bank. This
coverage defense, however, is not definitive. The concept of proximate cause under the Bankers Blanket Bond has not evolved
enough to support unequivocally South Brook's causation defense. 57 Although it is clear that the bond provides coverage only
57. Prior to 1976, the bond's insuring clauses provided coverage for losses sustained
"through" the various hazards for which coverage was provided. See Hinchey, Causation and Loss, in Banking: The Revised Bankers Blanket Bond and D&O Liability Insurance Coverage (Nov. 4, 1982) (Banking Law Institute seminar materials). Even then,
sureties contended that the bond was designed only to provide coverage for loss caused
directly by the action or behavior referenced in the insuring clauses and some courts
agreed. See, e.g., Miami Nat'l Bank v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 314 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.
Fla. 1970); Dirk v. Amerco Mktg. Co., 88 Wash. 2d 607, 565 P.2d 90 (1977). Most
courts held otherwise. See, e.g., Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Md. v. USAFORM Hall
Pool, Inc., 523 F.2d 744, 57 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 950 (1976); Maryland
Casualty Co. v. American Trust Co., 71 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 583
(1934). Probably in response, the Surety Association of America (the "Association")
dispensed with the term "through." In 1976, it drafted a rider that replaced the term
with the phrase "loss resulting directly from." In 1980, the Association placed the phrase
in the Standard Form. See generally Bassett, Direct Loss Under the Fidelity Insuring
Agreement of the FinancialInstitution Bond, 54 DEF. COUNS. J. 487 (1987); Causation
and Loss, supra; Hinchey, supra note 5, at 9-9.
The issue of concurrent causation is another issue a lawyer should bear in mind. The
bond's exclusions section attempts to diminish the problems associated with concurrent
causation. The exclusions section provides that if a covered peril is primarily responsible
for a loss, then the insured only may invoke the insuring agreement covering that peril.
This restriction exists even if another clause might otherwise provide coverage for loss
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for "direct loss," that term"8 has never attained a precise meaning.
Indeed, direct loss probably defies uniform definition because the
very concept of proximate cause is one of the most chameleon-like

in the law. 9
In insurance law, the meaning of proximate cause is highly fact
sensitive. It changes as a function of different kinds of loss-producing events and different insuring clauses in a policy or bond.' The
caused by a hazard that is secondarily present in the same situation leading to the loss.
For example, Exclusion § 2(a) provides that the bond does not cover "loss resulting directly or indirectly from forgery or alteration, except when covered under Insuring
Agreements (A), (D), (E), or (F)." BOND LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 10. Thus, if false
pretenses are accomplished through forgery or alteration, then there can be no coverage
under the on premises insuring agreement. Similarly, Exclusion § 2(h) eliminates coverage for "loss caused by an employee, except when covered under Insuring Agreement
(A)." Id. Even if a dishonest or fraudulent employee causes loss through forgery, alteration, false pretenses, or counterfeit securities, coverage will exist only if his acts fall within
the Fidelity Insuring Agreement. Id. Every insuring agreement in the bond has a corresponding exclusion functionally analogous to these examples. Id. at 8-11.
58. The term "direct loss" can be found at the beginning of each insuring clause in
the standard form. See BOND LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 9. A carrier may draft its
policy to avoid the inherent problems associated with determining coverage in concurrent
cause situations. Such a policy was the subject of State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Martin, 668 F. Supp. 1379 (C.D. Cal. 1987). In Martin, the insurer issued a homeowner's policy that excluded coverage for loss caused by water damage and earth movement. Id. at 1382. The homeowner sought reimbursement for damage caused by a
combination of covered and excluded causes. Id. at 1380. The policy provided that if
concurrent causes were responsible for a loss, then there would be no coverage if excluded causes were as directly responsible for the loss as covered causes. Id. at 1382. The
court upheld the policy language and granted summary judgment for the carrier. Id. at
1383.
Although any insurer may draft its policy in this fashion, this approach is not necessarily desirable because it reduces coverage. This may tempt insureds to pay a reduced
premium for less coverage, which is proper only if they understand the limitations inherent in the policy issued. On the other hand, when the insured's house is destroyed by
earthquake, flood, or fire, and coverage is unequivocally absent due to a non-covered
concurrent cause, the public policy goals served by insurance will not have been accomplished. Each insurer must make its own cost/benefit analysis, balancing the marketability of its policy against liability for coverage that it may never have intended to provide.
Notwithstanding the equitable predispositions of many courts resolving coverage disputes, insureds should also analyze the costs and benefits of purchasing greater or lesser
amounts and types of coverage. For a more detailed analysis of these concerns, see Oettle
& Howard, "Zuckerman and Sparks": The Validity of "Claims Made" Insurance Policies
as a Function of Retroactive Coverage, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 659 (1986).
59. See Brewer, Concurrent Causation in Insurance Contracts, 59 MICH. L. REV.
1141 (1961); McDowell, Causation in Contracts and Insurance, 20 CONN. L. REV. 569
(1988); McDowell, Foreseeability in Contract and Tort: The Problems of Responsibility
and Remoteness, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 286 (1985); Note, Autopsy of a Plain English
Insurance Contract:Can Plain English Survive Proximate Cause?, 59 WASH. L. REV. 565
(1984); Hinchey, Bankers and Savings and Loan Blanket Bonds, in Bank Insurance
(Nov. 18, 1985)(Executive Enterprises, Inc. seminar materials).
60. R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 1, § 5-5, at 545-63.
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decision to deem a cause proximate is, to a large extent, an unarticulated, equity-based conclusion that one party, rather than another, should bear the loss.

6

These equitable decisions are based

on factors such as comparative blameworthiness, future deterrence
of undesirable conduct, financial capacity to pay, sympathy for
policyholders, or enmity toward insurance companies. 62 For this
reason, direct loss remains undefined in the new financial institution bond.63
The insurance industry's inability to create a generic definition
for direct loss has two adverse consequences for bonding companies. First, notwithstanding the fact that adoption of the term direct loss64 was designed to limit coverage, the case law for the most
part has remained unchanged since the incorporation of that term
into the insuring clauses in the standard form. Second, and also in
spite of the motivation behind the change in nomenclature, the revision may have actually expanded coverage. The terminology is
now65 so amorphous that it tends to activate the doctrine of ambiguity. With respect to Happyvale's bond, and assuming coverage
61.

Id. See also R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 306-20 (1971).
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS; A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC

62. See G. CALABRESI,
ANALYSIS 24-129 (1970).
63.

BOND LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 13-25.

64. See supra note 57.
65. The doctrine of ambiguity provides that if the wording of an insurance policy is
subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, then the court should choose the
interpretation that favors coverage. Silverman & Lane, supra note 46, at 11. This presumption is based largely on the assumptions that insurance policies are contracts of
adhesion, that the insureds exercise no bargaining power in their formation, and that the
insurer is far more sophisticated than the insured with respect to insurance law concepts.
See B. OSTRAGER & T. NEWMAN, supra note 11, at 1-29. For this reason, the courts will
dispense with the doctrine of ambiguity when both parties to an insurance contract are
insurance companies. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 773 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1985);
Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 481 F.2d 948, 954 (2d Cir. 1973); Fortress Reinsurance, Inc. v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 333, 338 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 629
F.2d 860 (4th Cir. 1980). Recently, many courts have dispensed with the doctrine when
the insured, even though not an insurer, is highly sophisticated in matters relating to
insurance. See MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Central Bank, 838 F.2d 1382, 1387 (5th Cir.
1988); First State Underwriters Agency v. Travelers Ins. Co., 803 F.2d 1308, 1314 n.5 (3d
Cir. 1986). See also Werner Indus., Inc. v. First State Ins. Co., 112 N.J. 30, 38, 548 A.2d
188, 192 (1988). In Werner Industries, the court dispensed with contra-insurer presumptions with respect to commercial insurance purchased by a sophisticated corporation, but
noted that it would be willing to apply such presumptions to personal insurance issued to
unsophisticated individuals. Id. Although most commentators distinguish among the
contra-insurer "doctrines" of ambiguity, reasonable expectations, public policy, and unconscionability, they are in fact separate points along a linear continuum that merge into
one another at the interstices. See Howard, supra note 46, at 165-71.
Bonding companies have attempted to eliminate the impact of these contra-insurer
doctrines. They have characterized the standard form as arising from a joint effort by the
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litigation ensued between the bank and South Brook, a court could
rely upon the doctrine of ambiguity to resolve each issue of proximate cause against the insurer and, thus, sustain the bank's claim
for reimbursement under the on premises( clause.
D.

The Function and Application of the Bond's Loan Exclusion

South Brook should not conclude that the complexity of proximate cause and the doctrine of ambiguity preclude a definitive coverage defense under the on premises insuring clause because the
foregoing coverage analysis was conducted without considering the
bond's exclusions. If South Brook invokes the bond's loan exclusion," then it may eliminate or reduce any coverage that would
otherwise be found under the bond's on premises insuring clause.
The loan exclusion eliminates coverage for loss caused directly or
indirectly by default on a loan or any other transaction that is
functionally equivalent to a loan.67
The loan exclusion has strong public policy underpinnings.
Banks are in the business of making loans and the blanket bond is
not designed to serve as a safety net in the event the bank makes a
Surety Association of America and the American Bankers Association. Therefore, they
argue that the bond was bargained for by both parties to the contract, or at least by their
representatives. For the most part, courts have rejected this argument. They require that
the bargaining take place between the actual parties (surety and bank) to the particular
bond at issue. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Decatur v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 424
F.2d 312 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 939 (1970); Clarendon Bank & Trust v. Fidelity
& Deposit Co. of Md., 406 F. Supp. 1161, 1164 (E.D. Va. 1975); Shoals Nat'l Bank of
Florence v. Home Indem. Co., 384 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd, 515 F.2d 1182
(5th Cir. 1975). But see Sharp v. FSLIC, 858 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1988); National Bank of
Commerce v. Fidelity Casualty Co. of N.Y., 312 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd, 437
F.2d 96 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 906 (1971). See also Dingus & Haley, The
Doctrine of ContraProferentum in Fidelity Coverage Cases, 10 FORUM 75 (1974); Kirwan,
Bankers' Blanket Bonds: Contracts of Adhesion? 43 INS. COUNS. J. 386 (1976); Meter,
Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach, 50 VA. L. REV. 1178
(1964).
66. The loan exclusion provides:
This bond does not cover.., loss resulting directly or indirectly from the complete or partial non-payment of, or default upon, any loan or transaction in the
nature of a loan or extension of credit, whether involving the Insured as a
lender or as a borrower, including the purchase, discounting or other acquisition of false or genuine accounts, invoices, notes, agreements or Evidences of
Debt, whether such loan or transaction was procured in good faith or through
trick, artifice, fraud or false pretenses, except when covered under Insuring
Agreements (A) [fidelity], (D) [forgery or alteration], or (E) [securities].
BOND LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 10 (emphasis added).
67. Given that insurance companies draft the policies, it should come as no surprise
that while insuring clauses limit coverage to direct loss, the exclusions encompass loss
caused "directly or indirectly" by the relevant act. Id.
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bad loan based on a bad business decision. Financial bond coverage for bad business decisions would discourage banks from instituting adequate internal controls, such as checking the credit
references of borrowers, which help prevent the loss at the outset.68
It is precisely because of this concern that the loan exclusion
does not apply to coverage afforded under the fidelity, forgery, alteration, or securities insuring clauses. 69 No matter how scrupulous bank officials are, beyond a certain point, there is little they
can or should do to reduce the number of losses caused by an employee's dishonesty or by the institution's innocent reliance on
forged, altered, or counterfeit documents. Under the Fidelity Insuring Agreement, it would seem that a bank could reduce losses
by adopting more rigorous hiring and monitoring standards. Case
law surveys, however, disclose that sophisticated, high-ranking
personnel, who are long-time employees, are responsible for a disproportionate share of dishonesty-related losses.7" Even when financial transactions were less complex and less computerized, the
real danger was never that tellers would steal money from the cash
drawer or that customers would take pens, but rather that senior
executives would embezzle substantial funds over long periods of
time without being discovered. Increased scrutiny, undertaken
when these executives commence employment, probably would not
reduce the likelihood of future loss.
As for the forgery, alteration, and securities insuring clauses, a
sophisticated financial institution presumably could discern many
more forged, altered, or counterfeit documents before disbursing
funds in reliance on such paper. However, banks process a high
volume of these documents and the administrative cost of investigating the authenticity of each piece of paper, or the accuracy of its
representations, arguably would be prohibitive. Hence, there is no
strong policy argument against coverage for such losses.71
68. President Pokey's actions exemplify this concern. He believed that any Duckrelated loss would be covered by South Brook. This mind-set evidently lulled him into a
false sense of security that accentuated his carelessness.
69. See supra note 66.
70. See Skillern, Insuring Agreement (A) - Fidelity, in ANNOTATED BANKERS BLANKET BOND 53 (1980 & Supp. 1983); Seeman, Dishonest or FraudulentActs, in THE COMMERCIAL BLANKET BOND ANNOTATED 13-22 (A.B.A. 1985). Although Insuring
Agreement (A) is limited by its terms to employees, it is fairly typical for a bank to
purchase a rider that expands the definition of "employee" to include officers and
directors.
71. As noted in Exchange National Bank of Olean v. Insurance Company of North
America, 341 F.2d 673 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965):
There is a difference between extending credit on the basis of pledged counter-
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E. Application of the Loan Exclusion
Even though the first clause in the loan exclusion, which excludes coverage for loss caused by default on a loan or any other
transaction in the nature of a loan or extension of credit, is fairly
unambiguous, the second clause is much less clear.7 2 The second
clause excludes coverage for loss caused by the purchase, discounting, or other acquisition of accounts, invoices, notes, agreements,
or evidences of debt. Case law has failed to interpret the second
clause consistently. If the Happyvale-Valentino transaction is not
considered a loan, then this judicial inconsistency has considerable
implications for Happyvale's claim.
One line of cases holds that the second clause modifies the first
feit stock certificates, a risk clearly within the purview of the bond, and extending credit on the basis of invoices that cover non-existent shipments and
that have been submitted as evidence of previously pledged accounts receivable.
The bank could verify the existence of the pledged accounts receivable by inquiring with the loan applicant's purported customer, while detecting a counterfeit security is likely to pose significantly different and more serious risks to
the bank.
Id. at 676. See also East Gadsen Bank v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 415 F.2d
357 (5th Cir. 1969) (blanket bond is not a policy of credit insurance); Community Nat'l
Bank in Monmouth v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 399 F. Supp. 873 (S.D. I11.1975)
(loan exclusion negates coverage for losses associated with the credit risk of a loan made
in the banking business, even when the loan was obtained by false pretenses); Metropolitan Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hanover Ins. Co., 55 Misc. 2d 593, 595, 286 N.Y.S.2d 129, 131
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1967) (loan exclusion indicates that the bond is not insurance against risk
of routine banking losses); Koch, Exclusion-Loans and Paid Against Uncollected Funds,
in BANKERS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BLANKET BONDS 293 (A.B.A.
1979). According to Koch:
[T]he jurisprudence can be viewed as broadly stating that the loan exclusion
was intended to constitute an agreement between banks and sureties to the effect that 'losses resulting from poor credit judgment or mere negligence' in the
lending of money by banks will be excluded from the coverage of the Bankers
Blanket Bond. Said another way, the 'remedy for poor judgment cannot be
insurance .

. . .'

The courts have gone so far as to declare that in issuing a

Bankers Blanket Bond, a surety does not intend, or 'purport to provide a policy
of credit insurance.'
Koch, supra, at 299-300 (footnotes omitted).
Nonetheless, insureds may pay to avoid the impact of public policy. An insured may
purchase an amendment to section 2(e) (the loan exclusion) in the form of a fraudulent
mortgages rider covering loss caused by its reliance, in connection with a loan, upon real
property mortgages or deeds of trust that are defective because the signatures thereon
were obtained through fraud, artifice, trickery, or false pretenses. See Johnstone & Gasmann, Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance and Related Forms of Coverage for
Directors and Officers of Depository Institutions, in Failing Financial Institutions 1, 2728 (Nov. 5, 1987) (A.L.I.- A.B.A. seminar materials).
72. For the text of these clauses, see supra note 66.

1988]

Bankers Blanket Bond Coverage

clause by expanding the definition of a loan. 3 Alternatively, some
courts hold that the second clause of the exclusion is, in effect, a
separate exclusion for transactions that possess some indicia of a
loan, but not enough to constitute a loan under the first clause.74
Under this formulation, the term loan exclusion is a misnomer
when applied to the second clause. Given these different interpretations, the loan exclusion may be applied to Happyvale's loss in
several different ways. Some applications eliminate coverage entirely, whereas others merely reduce it.
1. Viewing the Entire Transaction as a Loan from Happyvale
to Valentino
South Brook should argue that the entire transaction between
Happyvale and Valentino was, in substance, a loan or series of
loans, rather than a sale or assignment of commercial paper. This
argument avoids the confusion inherent in construing the loan exclusion's second clause. Of greater significance, because The
Duck's failure to repay the loans would have directly or indirectly
caused Happyvale's entire loss, there can be no coverage under the
on premises insuring agreement.
To determine whether a transaction is a loan, courts look to substance, rather than form, and focus on written contracts in an effort to determine the intent of the parties.75 Intent, however, as
reflected in the terms of a contract, is not conclusive because the
parties may have intended to use their contract to disguise a loan
as a sale of commercial paper.76
73. See, e.g., Franklin Nat'l Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 266 N.W.2d
718, 718 (Minn. 1978).
74. See, e.g., United Va. Factors v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 624 F.2d 814 (4th
Cir. 1980) (separately discussing exclusions for default on loan and exclusion for nonpayment of accounts sold or assigned to insured); Shoals Nat'l Bank of Florence v. Home
Indem. Co., 384 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd, 515 F. 2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1975)
(treating loan exclusion as incorporating two specific exclusions).
75. See, e.g., Browne v. Nowlin, 117 Ariz. 73, 570 P.2d 1246 (1977); Standard Leasing Corp. v. Schmidt Aviation, Inc., 264 Ark. 851, 576 S.W.2d 181 (1979); Burr v. Capital Reserve Corp., 71 Cal. 2d 983, 458 P.2d 185, 80 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1969); Steffenauer v.
Mytelka & Rose, Inc., 87 N.J. Super. 506, 210 A.2d 88 (1965), aff'd, 46 N.J. 299, 216
A.2d 585 (1966).
76. There are a variety of reasons why a borrower and a lender might seek to disguise
a loan. Some typical justifications include: avoidance of federal lending limit laws, known
as "overline violations," 12 U.S.C. §§ 84, 93 (1982); avoidance of proscribed involvement
by a bank in real estate investments, particularly when a loan is made to an affiliate of the
financial institution, known as a "controlling person," 12 C.F.R. §§ 32.1 to 32.111
(1988), 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (1982); and avoidance of subsequent characterization of the loan
as usurious under applicable state law. Usury and collection of unlawful debts are predicate acts under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18
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Because the term "loan" is not defined in Happyvale's bond, a
court will consult case law in search of an appropriate definition.77
New Jersey law will control the issue because the bond was issued
in New Jersey, the loss occurred in New Jersey, and there was no
alternative choice of law provision in the bond or the loan participation contract.7" The court will find that in New Jersey, as elsewhere, a loan has two primary elements: first, the lender advances
money to another party, the borrower; and second, the borrower
agrees to repay the money to the lender in the future, often with
interest.79
U.S.C. § 1961 (1982), as well as under most state anti-racketeering laws. Annotation,
Civil Action for Damages Under State Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization
Acts (RICO)for Losses from RacketeeringActivity, 62 A.L.R.4TH 654 (1988). Given that
treble damages are assessed under civil applications of anti-racketeering laws, there is
considerable incentive to disguise a loan transaction. See Howard, Moving to Dismiss a
Civil RICO Action, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 423 (1987). It is unclear whether such damages
may be covered by insurance. See Hellerstein & Mullins, The Likely Insurance Treatment of Treble Damage RICO Judgments, 42 Bus. LAW. 121 (1986); Ichel & Thompson,
Directors'and Officers' Insurance Coverage: An Overview and Current Problems, in DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY INSURANCE 220 (Practicing Law Institute 1988);
Lorentzen, Blame it on RICO: The Impact of the Racketeer Influenced and CorruptOrganizations Act on the Insurance Industry Following Sedima, 36 FED'N INS. & CORP.
COUNS. Q. 3 (1985).
77. The 1986 version of Standard Form No. 24 provides that a loan encompasses "all
extensions of credit by the Insured and all transactions creating a creditor relationship in
favor of the Insured and all transactions by which the Insured assumes an existing creditor relationship." BOND LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 23. Under this definition, South
Brook probably would have an easier time proving that the Happyvale-Valentino transaction was, in substance, a loan rather than a sale or assignment of commercial paper.
78. Conflict of Law issues are beyond the scope of this Article; therefore, the hypothetical does not raise conflict issues. New Jersey law would control substantive issues in
either state or federal court. See generally R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW
§ 144, at 353-55 (2d ed. 1977); E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICTS OF LAWS 675-76 (West
1982); R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 348-97 (2d ed. 1980).
79. Freeman adsm. Brittin, 17 N.J.L. 191, 231 (Sup. Ct. 1839) ("The incidents appertaining to a contract for the loan of money are few and simple; an advancement of money,
by the lender at the time of the contract, and a stipulation or agreement to repay it and
generally with interest, at a future day, by the borrower or some other person in his
behalf and on his account."). Accord Calcasiere-Marine Nat'l Bank of St. Charles v.
American Employers' Ins. Co., 533 F.2d 290, 296-97 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.,
Louisiana Bank & Trust Co. v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 429 U.S. 922 (1976);
Tierman v. Carasalja Pines, 51 N.J. Super. 393, 404-05, 143 A.2d 892, 898 (App. Div.
1958). Even though the court will look to New Jersey law to construe the policy, this
definition of a loan is universally accepted. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 844 (5th ed.
1979); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 738 (2d College ed. 1985). As noted
earlier, courts also are prone to consult dictionary definitions to ascertain the meaning
that should be attributed to undefined terms in a standardized contract. See supra note
46. Although the definition of a loan does not require that interest accompany repayment
of principal, a court deciding a blanket bond coverage action will be more likely to find a
loan if the payment of interest is, in fact, required. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.
v. FDIC, 204 F.2d 933, 936-37 (8th Cir. 1953).
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Given these standards and the definition of a loan, the Happyvale court may reasonably conclude that Happyvale made a loan
to Valentino. At the time each package of loans was purchased,
Happyvale advanced a sum of money to Valentino. Valentino was
in turn required to repay these sums to Happyvale in the future,
along with sixteen percent interest per annum. 8° Although in form
the transactions between Happyvale and The Duck masqueraded
as sales or assignments of commercial paper, in substance they memorialized loans.
No New Jersey court has addressed the loan issue in the blanket
bond context. Several other jurisdictions, however, have determined in similar circumstances that a transaction was a "loan" for
purposes of applying the blanket bond's loan exclusion. s In these
cases, the banks argued that the commercial paper had been sold
or assigned to them. 2 But, the courts looked beyond the form of
the transactions as memorialized in the contracts and found, instead, that the banks had made loans that were collateralized by
84
the commercial paper.8 3 The decision in In re Grand Union Co.

is particularly persuasive in the Happyvale context. Even though
the case did not involve coverage under a blanket bond, the court
primarily addressed whether a transaction was either a loan collateralized by commercial paper or the sale of commercial paper and
concluded that the transaction was a loan. 5
80. Characterizing the transaction as a loan is further supported by the fact that Valentino repaid Happyvale until October 1983. These repayments were made notwithstanding the fact that many of the homeowners defaulted on their obligations to pay The
Duck.
81. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 510 F.2d 7 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975) (loan when bank advanced funds in exchange for
automobile installment contracts); Twin City Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. Transamerica
Ins. Co., 413 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1969) (loan when bank advanced funds in exchange for
direct assignment of promissory notes); North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Lumberman's Mut.
Casualty Co., 335 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1964) (per curiam) (loan when bank purchased 75%
of face amount of sales invoices).
82. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 510 F.2d at 11; Twin City Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
413 F.2d at 495; North Carolina Nat7 Bank, 335 F.2d at 487.
83. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 510 F.2d at 11, 12; Twin City Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n., 413 F.2d at 499; North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 335 F.2d at 487.
84. 219 F. 353 (2d Cir. 1914), appeal dismissed, 238 U.S. 647 (1915).
85. Id. at 356-59. In Grand Union, the seller owned installment promissory notes
that obligated underlying borrowers to repay the purchase price of pianos. Id. at 360. A
corporation purchased a fixed percentage of the face amount of each note and the installment loan contracts then were assigned to the corporate purchaser. The seller, for additional consideration, was to collect all payments due under the notes and remit them to
the corporation. In other words, the seller was to act in the separate capacity of servicing
contractor. Id. If any underlying borrower defaulted, then the agreement provided that
the seller would repurchase the notes. Id. at 361 Testimony adduced at trial established
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In Grand Union, the written contract between the parties described their agreement as a sale of commercial paper with the
seller acting as a servicing contractor.8 6 The court focused on the
substance of the transaction, paying particular attention to three
circumstances. 87 First, the seller had continuing responsibility for
collecting payments due on the notes. Second, the seller had continuing responsibility to repay the purchaser even if an underlying
borrower defaulted. Third, the seller was obligated, at the request
of the purchaser, to repurchase the notes in the event that an underlying borrower defaulted. 8 The court reasoned that if there
had been a true sale of commercial paper, then the seller would not
have retained these post-sale obligations.8 9 Therefore, the court
held that the transaction was in substance a loan and that the
promissory notes merely collateralized that loan.90
The federal securities laws similarly support South Brook's argument that the relationship between Happyvale and Valentino
should be characterized as a loan. When parties to loan participation agreements are damaged and seek redress in federal court,
they invoke jurisdiction under the federal securities laws by claiming that the loan participation was a security. Defendants have
often moved to dismiss these actions on the ground that a loan
participation is not a security. 91 The majority of courts have
agreed, noting that the purchase of a participation interest in a loan
is itself a commercial loan transaction rather than a form of
investment.92
that the seller paid the corporate purchaser out of its general funds and that the purchaser looked only to the seller, rather than to the pianists, for a return on its investment.
Id.
86. Id. at 354-55.
87. Id. at 356.
88. Id. at 361.
89. Id. at 361-62. With respect to servicing the loans, there is no reason why a seller
of commercial paper should not also have the right to separately function as a servicing
contractor, as would someone who acted exclusively in that capacity.
90. Id. at 359. See also Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 238 F. 502 (8th
Cir. 1916). In Merchants' NationalBank, the court held that the purported sale of promissory notes by one bank to another was in fact a loan. Id. at 507. In reaching this
conclusion, the court focused on the seller's obligation to guarantee repayment and repurchase. The court thought that these conditions were consistent with collateralizing a loan
but not with the true alienation of an asset. Id.
91. See, e.g., First State Bank v. American Nat'l Bank, 690 F. Supp. 967, 968 (D.
Wyo. 1988).
92. Danner v. Himmelfarb, 858 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1988); Union Planters Nat'l Bank
v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1124 (1981); Kansas State Bank v. Citizens Bank of Windsor, 737 F.2d 881 (8th
Cir. 1986); First State Bank of Wheatland v. American Nat'l Bank, 690 F. Supp. 967 (D.
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In sum, the substance of the Happyvale-Valentino transactions
indicates that the Home Improvement Loan Participation Agreements memorialized loans. This conclusion is supported by the
traditional definition of a loan, the cases construing similar transactions, and the dicta in the securities actions. Therefore, South
Brook may successfully invoke the bond's loan exclusion to exclude coverage for any loss caused directly by The Duck's false
pretenses.
2.

Viewing the Transaction as a Purchase of Evidences of Debt

Should a court decline to treat the Happyvale-Valentino transaction as a loan and construe the second part of the loan exclusion as
a narrower exclusion for transactions with only some indicia of a
loan, South Brook may still argue that the exclusion is applicable.
This argument succeeded in United Virginia Factorsv. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. 9a In United Virginia Factors, the insured
purchased eighty-five percent of the face amount of fictitious accounts receivable and then reported a loss under its blanket bond
resulting from false pretenses. 94 Although the court held that the
transaction was not a loan and that the second clause of the loan
exclusion was separate and narrower than the first, it nonetheless
denied coverage. 9 The United Virginia Factors court concluded
that the nonpayment of notes, accounts, or other evidences of debt
that were sold to the insured caused all the loss. 96 The court held
Wyo. 1988); Financial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Savings Inv. Serv. Corp., [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 93,190 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 11, 1986); Deauville
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Westwood Say. & Loan Ass'n, 648 F. Supp. 513 (C.D. Cal. 1986);
Citizens State Bank v. FDIC, 639 F. Supp. 758 (W.D. Okla. 1986); Provident Nat'l Bank
v. Frankford Trust Co., 468 F. Supp. 448 (E.D. Pa. 1979). See also Glidden, When are
Loans Securities Transactions?A Proposed Test, 13 SEC. REG. L. J. 212 (1985); Sabel &
Plache, Selected Legal Aspects of Structured Mortgage and Receivable Financing, in NEW
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 861-77 (Practicing Law Institute 1988). But see Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969); W. KNEPPER & D.
BAILEY, supra note 2, at 377-78 (erroneously predicting that courts would probably treat
loan participations as securities).
As is the case when a court must determine whether any instrument is a security, it will
apply the four-pronged test established in SEC v. W.J. Howey, Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99,
reh'g denied, 329 U.S. 819 (1946). The court will determine whether the surrounding
transaction reflects: (1) an investment of money; (2) in a common enterprise; (3) premised upon a reasonable expectation of profit; (4) to be derived from the entrepreneurial
efforts of others. Id. See First State Bank, 690 F. Supp. at 967 (after applying the fourpronged test, the court held that a loan participation interest was not a security).
93. 624 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1980).
94. Id. at 815.
95. Id. at 816.
96. Id. at 818.
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that this was precisely the type of loss for which coverage9 7was excluded by the second clause of the bond's loan exclusion.
If Happyvale's claim is subjected to the same analysis adopted
by the court in United Virginia Factors,then coverage under the on
premises insuring clause will be excluded by the second part of the
loan exclusion. Coverage will be excluded even if a court finds that
the Happyvale-Valentino transactions did not constitute a loan or
series of loans. On the other hand, if the second part of the loan
exclusion is applied more restrictively than in United Virginia Factors (i.e., only in the event that a homeowner defaulted), then coverage will depend on the type of loans that caused each loss that
the bank sustained.
a. Loans Prepaid in Full
The exclusion will not eliminate coverage for losses attributable
to loans prepaid in full because the homeowners did not default.
Rather, they satisfied their obligations in full when they prepaid
Valentino. This is not of great consequence because there will still
be no coverage for this category of loss. The Duck did not misrepresent the status of these loans on the bank's premises at or prior to
the time Happyvale purchased its participation interests in these
98
loans.

b.

Notes and Mortgage Assignments Signed in Blank

The exclusion will not eliminate coverage if the court finds that
the borrowers had no obligations with respect to documents fraudulently completed and sold by Valentino because, by definition, a
borrower without an obligation to repay may not be deemed to
have defaulted. Under section 3-407 of the UCC, 9 however, he
who signs an incomplete instrument is liable to a subsequent
holder in due course even after the instrument is completed by a
third party without consent.1°° Thus, a court should rule that the
borrowers were obligated to repay, that Happyvale's loss was thus
caused directly or indirectly by their default, and that coverage is
therefore excluded by the second portion of the loan exclusion,
97. Id.
98. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
99. See 6 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-407, at 210
(3d ed. 1984).
100. Id. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. State Bank of Salem, 412 N.E.2d
103 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Virginia Capital Bank v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 231 Va.
283, 343 S.E.2d 81 (1986).
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even under its most pro-insured interpretation.10°
c. Multiple Pledging
The exclusion will not eliminate coverage if the homeowners
paid financial institutions other than Happyvale. In this event,
Happyvale's loss would not have been caused directly or indirectly
by their default because they did not default. Coverage would be
excluded if the homeowners made no payments to any bank because, in that event, it would be proper to conclude that Happyvale's loss resulted directly or indirectly from their default.
d. Loans Made to Delinquent Borrowers
The exclusion will eliminate coverage for loss caused by loans
made to delinquent borrowers because the loss resulted directly or
indirectly from the homeowners' failure to make any payments.
Such loss fits squarely within the exclusionary language of the second portion of the loan exclusion, no matter how it is construed.
F

A Comment on Coverage Under the On Premises Clause
By relying on the proximate cause requirement in Insuring
Agreement (B) and on the second part of the bond's loan exclusion, South Brook may eliminate or substantially reduce any coverage that might otherwise exist under the on premises insuring
clause. And, by relying on the first part of the loan exclusion,
South Brook has the best chance of avoiding coverage for the entire claim. To succeed, South Brook must characterize the entire
transaction between Happyvale and The Duck as a loan. Once this
characterization is accepted, no court will hold that Valentino's
default was neither directly nor indirectly related to Happyvale's
loss.
Definitive predictions are nonetheless difficult because the requirement of direct loss in the on premises clause is difficult to
define and the second part of the loan exclusion is subject to vary101. Experience indicates that many courts are loathe to undertake analysis as complex as this. Rather, they are more likely to throw up their hands at the complexities of
the second clause of the loan exclusion and rule for the insured on the grounds of ambiguity, reasonable expectations, public policy, or unconscionability. For this very reason,
when an insurer's only defense to coverage is found in the second clause of the loan
exclusion, it should consider settlement rather than litigation. As a result, the insurer
will avoid an unfavorable reported decision. To this end, insurers that lose at the trial
level will often settle while the case is pending appeal, but only on the condition that the
disposition below is vacated by the appellate court to wipe the slate clean. See 11 INSURANCE LITIGATION REPORTER

96-97 (1989).
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ing interpretations. The best prediction is that the loan exclusion
proper will eliminate any possibility of coverage under the on
premises insuring clause because the Happyvale-Valentino transactions satisfy the accepted definition of a "loan." This result would
be consistent with the public policy that underlies the exclusion,
namely, to deter financial institutions from sustaining loss caused
by bad business decisions. This policy is promoted by eliminating
insurability for such loss, which in turn creates an incentive for an
insured bank's managers to act more prudently. President Pokey,
and others like him, evidently require just such an incentive.
V.

COVERAGE UNDER INSURING AGREEMENT
10 2
"FORGERY OR ALTERATION"'

(D):

Insuring Clause (D) provides coverage for loss resulting directly
from the forgery or alteration of documents 10 3 on which the banking industry frequently relies. To determine whether a particular
loss is covered under this insuring clause, it is necessary to decide
whether an act of forgery or alteration has occurred, the forged or
altered document falls within the category of writings for which
the clause provides coverage, and whether the causal connection
between the forgery or alteration and the loss is sufficiently proximate to satisfy the insuring clause's requirement of "direct" loss. O
102. The forgery or alteration insuring agreement, denominated Insuring Agreement
(D), covers:
Loss resulting directly from
(1) Forgery or alteration of, on or in any Negotiable Instrument (except an
Evidence of Debt), Acceptance, withdrawal order, receipt for the withdrawal of
Property, Certificate of Deposit or Letter of Credit.
(2) transferring, paying or delivering any funds or Property or establishing
any credit or giving any value on the faith of any written instructions or advices
directed to the Insured and authorizing or acknowledging the transfer,
payment, delivery or receipt of funds or Property, which instructions or advices
purport to have been signed or endorsed by any customer of the Insured or by
any banking institution but which instructions or advice either bear a signature
which is a Forgery or have been altered without the knowledge or consent of
such customer or banking institution. Telegraphic, cable or teletype
instructions or advices, as aforesaid, exclusive of transmissions of electronic
funds transfer systems, sent by a person other than the said customer or
banking institution purporting to send such instructions or advices shall be
deemed to bear a signature which is a forgery.
A mechanically reproduced facsimile signature is treated the same as a
handwritten signature.
BOND LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 9.
103. The documents covered include negotiable instruments (except evidences of
debt), acceptances, withdrawal orders, receipts for the withdrawal of property, certificates of deposit, and letters of credit. Id.
104. See generally Connally, Forgery or Alteration, in BANKERS AND OTHER FINAN-
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The bond defines forgery as "the signing of the name of another
with intent to deceive," 1 5 and, even in the absence of such a definition, case law is generally in accord.' 06 Neither Valentino nor anyone else signed the name of another to any of the documents at
issue. Therefore, South Brook will have no exposure under the forgery component of the forgery or alteration insuring agreement.
In contrast to forgery, the term "alteration" is not defined in the
Bankers Blanket Bond."0 7 The only loss-producing act that arguably could constitute alteration would be Valentino's unauthorized
completion of instruments signed in blank by the homeowners.
Absent a definition of alteration, a court must look to case law.
Case law, however, has not rendered a clearly accepted definition.
Many decisions define alteration as a change in a document that is
already legally complete. 108 Under this line of authority, The
Duck's unauthorized completion of promissory notes or mortgage
assignments would not amount to alteration because the documents were not legally complete when he engaged in such
conduct. 109
There is, however, other authority indicating that the unauthorCIAL INSTITUTION BLANKET BONDS 153 (A.B.A. 1979); Connally, Insuring Agreement
(D) - Forgery or Alteration, in ANNOTATED BANKERS BLANKET BOND 78 (ABA Tort &

Ins. Prac. Sec. 1980 & Supp. 1983).
105. BOND LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 10.
106. See, e.g., Charter Bank Northwest v. Evanston Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 379, 381 (5th
Cir. 1986); State Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Maryland Casualty Co., 289 F.2d 544, 547-48
(8th Cir. 1961); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 147 Colo.
446,451-52, 364 P.2d 202, 206 (1961); People v. Gould, 347 Ill. 298, 303, 179 N.E. 848,
850 (1932). In CharterBank Northwest, the court held that forgery requires the signing
of the name of another even though the bond did not define "forgery." The court did
note a narrow exception for one who signs his own name with the fraudulent intent of
having the signature taken as that of another with the same name. CharterBank Northwest, 791 F.2d at 205-06. But see Roodhouse Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of
Md., 426 F.2d 1347, 1349 (7th Cir. 1970) ("forgery, under Illinois law, includes any
alteration or false writing in an instrument made for the purpose of defrauding a transferee of the instrument"). Accord People v. Mau, 377 I11.
199, 206-07, 36 N.E.2d 235,
237-38 (1941).
107. BOND LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 10-11. Similarly, alteration is not defined in
the 1986 revision of Standard Form No. 24. Id. at 22-23.
108. See Wilson v. Windolph, 103 N.J. Eq. 275, 277, 143 A. 346, 347 (N.J. Eq. 1928)
("alteration in the legal sense relates wholly to the change in some feature of a paper
already legally complete"). Accord Crawford v. Trans World Airline, 27 N.J. Super. 567,
570, 99 A.2d 673, 674 (Law Div. 1953). See also United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Idaho First Nat'l
Bank, 378 F.2d 62, 68 (9th Cir. 1967) ("Changes made in a blank printed form would not
constitute an 'alteration' within the [Securities Insuring Agreement]"); In re Schick Oil &
Gas, Inc., 35 Bankr. 282, 286-87 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983).
109. In re Schick Oil & Gas, Inc., 35 Bankr. at 286-87; Wilson, 103 N.J. Eq. at 275,
143 A. at 347; Crawford, 27 N.J. Super. at 570, 99 A.2d at 674; United Pac. Ins. Co., 378
F.2d at 68.
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ized completion of an incomplete instrument may indeed constitute alteration.' 0 Criminal and civil statutes in New Jersey plainly
state that alteration encompasses the unauthorized completion of
promissory notes and other evidences of debt. New Jersey's Commercial Code provides that alteration includes a change in "an incomplete instrument, by completing it otherwise than as
authorized.""' Similarly, New Jersey's Criminal Code defines alteration as the completion of a writing "so that it purports to be
the act of another who did not authorize that act.""' 2 Given these
provisions, a court applying New Jersey law is likely to conclude
that the unauthorized completion of promissory notes or mortgage
assignments constitutes alteration as the term is used in the forgery
or alteration clause.
Assuming that a court finds that Valentino altered documents
on which Happyvale detrimentally relied, South Brook could still
avoid exposure because the forgery or alteration clause does not
cover loss caused by reliance on "evidences of debt."" 3 The promissory notes and mortgage assignments are evidences of debt.' In
the hypothetical, these were the only instruments that Valentino
arguably altered. Thus, it would appear that, even assuming that
110. See Quick Serv. Box Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 95 F.2d 15, 16-17 (7th
Cir. 1938) (forgery is alteration with the intent to defraud and the unauthorized filling in
of blanks satisfies this definition); Baldwin Motors, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 24
Conn. Supp. 498, 505, 194 A.2d 709, 712-13 (1963) (the unauthorized filling in of blanks
satisfies a blanket bond's definitions of forgery and alteration). See also Annotation, Procuring Signature by Fraudas Forgery, 11 A.L.R.3D 1074 (1967).
111.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:3-407(b) (West 1985). See also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3-

407 (1986) ("[a]ny alteration of an instrument is material which changes the contract of
any party thereto in any respect, including any change in ...an incomplete instrument,
by completing it otherwise than as authorized"); Virginia Capital Bank v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 231 Va. 283, 284, 343 S.E.2d 81, 82 (1986).
112. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-1 (West 1985). For two decisions that adopted an
extremely broad definition of alteration, see Roodhouse National Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 426 F.2d 1347, 1349-50 (7th Cir. 1970); Stix Friedman & Co. v.
Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 563 S.W.2d 517, 521 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
113. Insuring Clause (D) covers loss resulting from "[florgery or alteration of, on or
in any Negotiable Instrument (except an Evidence of Debt), Acceptance, withdrawal order, receipt for the withdrawal of Property, Certificate of Deposit or Letter of Credit."
BOND LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 9. The 1980 bond defines a negotiable instrument as
any writing signed by the maker or drawer, containing an unconditional promise or order
to pay a sum certain in Money and no other promise, order, obligation or power given by
the maker or drawer, payable on demand or at a definite time, and payable to order or
bearer. Id. at 10.
114. The bond defines an "evidence of debt" as "an instrument, including a Negotiable Instrument, executed by a customer of the Insured and held by the Insured which in
the regular course of business is treated as evidencing the customer's debt to the Insured." Id.
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these documents were altered, the forgery or alteration clause
could not cover the resulting loss." 5
Even if a court found that the instruments signed in blank were
altered by Valentino and were not evidences of debt, South Brook
could still avoid exposure under the forgery or alteration clause on
causation grounds. South Brook may again argue that Happyvale's loss did not result directly from Valentino's alteration of
the notes, but rather from Happyvale's inability or unwillingness to
enforce the notes against their makers or endorsers.I 6
The court in Virginia Capital Bank v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co." ' reached precisely this conclusion. In Virginia Capital Bank,
the insured bank sought coverage for the amount of a loan that was
secured by a fraudulently altered promissory note. The court ruled
that pursuant to Virginia's Commercial Code, the bank was a
holder in due course with "the right to enforce the note in its present form against the maker and the endorser for the full amount
filled in." '" 8 Because the note was enforceable at the time the loan
was made, the moment when a direct loss must occur to trigger
coverage under the bond," 9 the alteration did not directly cause
the bank's loss. Instead, the court held that the bank's inability to
enforce the note was the proximate cause of its loss. Therefore,
coverage was denied. 2 °
115. As a caveat, however, it should be noted that the bond defines an "evidence of
debt" as "an instrument ...executed by a customer of the Insured." See supra note 114
(emphasis added). No case law has considered whether debtors such as the homeowners
are Happyvale's customers because the bank ultimately could enforce the promissory
notes. Also, the fact that Happyvale may be a holder in due course of these instruments
does not impact on the meaning of the term "customer" as used in the blanket bond.
Assuming that the blanket bond was not intended to cover such loss under Insuring
Clause (D), a court may justifiably overlook this technicality. See Community Nat'l
Bank in Monmouth v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 399 F. Supp. 873 (S.D. Ill. 1975)
(rejecting an insured's coverage claim based on an extremely technical analysis of the
bond's grammar, punctuation, and syntax). If, however, it found no coverage elsewhere
in the bond and was intent on protecting Happyvale as a matter of equity, then a court
may reason that the absence of an original customer relationship between Happyvale and
the homeowners is a basis for finding coverage. See Jones v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
270 Cal. App. 2d 779, 76 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1969). In Jones, the guarantor was not a customer at the time the bank extended credit on the basis of a forged instrument, but had
become a customer by the time of the final advance of funds by the bank. The court
found coverage on the ground that the bond's "customer" requirement was ambiguous
and therefore must be construed in favor of coverage. Id. at 786, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
116. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
117. 231 Va. 283, 288, 343 S.E.2d 81, 84 (1986). See May, Annual Survey of Fidelity
and Surety Law, 1986, Part 1, 54 DEF. COUNS. J. 47, 60-61 (1987).
118. Virginia Capital Bank, 231 Va. at 286, 343 S.E.2d at 83.
119. See supra note 52.
120. Virginia Capital Bank, 231 Va. at 288, 343 S.E.2d at 84. According to the court:
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The Virginia Capital Bank holding should be persuasive in the
Happyvale context. New Jersey has adopted the UCC provision
on which the Virginia CapitalBank court relied.1 21 Therefore, it is
quite likely that a New Jersey court would adopt the reasoning of
that decision. As a result, South Brook should deny coverage
under the forgery or alteration clause for loss sustained by Happyvale in connection with instruments signed in blank and fraudulently completed by The Duck.
As is true for the loan exclusion, the defense based on the right
of a holder in due course to enforce an incomplete instrument
against its maker or endorser has strong public policy underpinnings. 22 Both coverage defenses illustrate that the bond is neither
intended to serve as credit insurance nor to reimburse a bank for
loss caused by an ordinary business risk, such as making a bad
loan. 23 These policy concerns are particularly salient when the
avoided the loss through the exercise of reasonbank could have
1 24
able diligence.
Because the note is enforceable by the Bank, we do not agree with the Bank's
contention that it suffered a 'loss' within the terms of the policy at the time it
disbursed the loan proceeds in reliance on the altered note. No 'loss' is incurred
by paying value for a valid and enforceable instrument .

. .

. [E]ven if the

Bank's efforts to enforce the note should prove unavailing, its loss would not be
due to the alteration, but rather would be the product of the ordinary business
risks to which all lenders are subject. Losses of the latter kind are outside the
coverage of the 'banker's blanket bond' involved here.
Id. Accord St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. State Bank of Salem, 412 N.E.2d 103 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1980).
121. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:3-407(3) (West 1985) ("[a] subsequent holder in due
course may in all cases enforce the instrument according to its original tenor, and when
an incomplete instrument has been completed, he may enforce it as completed").
122. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
123. Id.
124. In the case of a loan secured by inadequate collateral or a worthless personal
guaranty, a bank can check on the collateral or the creditworthiness of the guarantor. In
the case of notes signed in blank and thereafter fraudulently completed, the UCC affords
the bank an opportunity to recover its loss from the maker or endorser of the incomplete
instrument. To the extent that this protection is rendered meaningless because the putative defendants are judgment-proof or not subject to personal jurisdiction, the bank
should absorb the loss. It could have consulted the note's signatory to corroborate his
intent to borrow funds. The bank also could have provided the underlying borrower with
notice of its intended purchase of the loan participation interest and thus afford him the
opportunity to object to the validity of the underlying obligation. Arguably, these precautions are economically and administratively feasible.
Case law holds that a bank may not be deprived of coverage as a result of its negligence. See First Nat'l Bank of Fort Walton Beach v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
416 F.2d 52 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 417 F.2d 1339 (5th Cir. 1969). The terms and
conditions on the face of the bankers blanket bond do not conflict with this conclusion.
Nonetheless, when the terms, conditions, limitations, exclusions, and definitions in the
contract are considered together, they penalize the financial institution that negligently
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In sum, South Brook has several good reasons for declining coverage under the forgery or alteration insuring agreement. First,
Happyvale's loss was not caused by forgery and may not have been
caused by alteration. Second, even assuming alteration, the forgery
or alteration clause does not encompass loss caused by the alteration of evidences of debt. Third, if the first two coverage defenses
are discounted, South Brook may still deny coverage because there
was no direct causal connection between The Duck's alteration
and Happyvale's loss.
VI.

COVERAGE UNDER INSURING AGREEMENT
"SECURITIES"

(E):

Insuring Clause (E) provides coverage for loss caused directly by
the insured's good faith reliance on certain types of documents that
are forged, altered, lost, stolen, or counterfeit. 2 ' Unlike Insuring
Clause (D), which expressly excludes evidences of debt, the Securiconducts its business. As applied in particular cases, the bond should be construed as
more than the sum of its parts. Jurists are loathe to expressly recognize the existence of
such an unexpressed "theme," which, like a jigsaw puzzle, is visible only after all of the
separate pieces have been put together in the proper fashion. The cases correctly hold
that an otherwise covered loss will not be excluded merely because of the financial institution's negligence. The loss, however, may not be covered in the first place under the
terms of the Bankers Blanket Bond precisely because of such negligence.
125. The securities insuring agreement, denominated Insuring Agreement (E),
covers:
Loss resulting directly from the Insured having, in good faith, for its own account or for
the account of others,
(1) acquired, sold or delivered, or given value, extended credit or assumed liability,
on the faith of, or otherwise acted upon, any original
(a) Security
(b) Document of Title,
(c) deed, mortgage or other instrument conveying title to, or creating or discharging
a lien upon, real property,
(d) Certificate of Origin or Title,
(e) Evidence of Debt,
(f) corporate, partnership or personal Guarantee, or
(g) Security Agreement which
(i) bears a signature of any maker, drawer, issuer, endorser, assignor, lessee, transfer agent, registrar, acceptor, surety, guarantor, or of any person signing in any other
capacity which is a Forgery, or
(ii) is altered, or
(iii) is lost or stolen;
(2) guaranteed in writing or witnessed any signature upon any transfer, assignment,
bill of sale, power of attorney, Guarantee, endorsement or any items listed in (a)
through (g) above;
(3) acquired, -sold or delivered, or given value, extended credit or assumed liability,
on the faith of, or otherwise acted upon, any item listed in (a) through (d) above which
is a Counterfeit.
Actual physical possession of the items listed in (a) through (g) above by the Insured,
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ties Insuring Agreement expressly encompasses such instruments
under certain circumstances. In Happyvale's case, the Securities
Insuring Agreement arguably covers the bank's loss because Pokey
relied on promissory notes and mortgage 'assignments that Valentino presented for inspection before the bank purchased each package of home improvement loans. The existence of coverage will
depend on whether these instruments were forged, altered, lost,
stolen, or counterfeit and whether Happyvale relied on them in
good faith.
A.

Characteristicsof the Instruments Relied On

Happyvale has not alleged that any promissory notes or mortgages on which it relied were lost or stolen. With respect to forgery and alteration, Valentino's unauthorized completion is the
only conduct that arguably could fall within these categories. In
this regard, the analysis of the forgery or alteration clause applies
with full force and effect.' 2 6 Assuming that the instruments were
counterfeit, this would not necessarily trigger coverage for all of
Happyvale's losses. Under the Securities Insuring Agreement, coverage for loss caused by counterfeit documents does not extend to
evidences of debt (i.e., the promissory notes). It is restricted to
securities, documents of title, deeds, mortgages, other title-conveying instruments, and certificates of origin.127 There may be a question whether an assignment of mortgage used to collateralize a
loan may be characterized as an evidence of debt or must be
treated exclusively as a mortgage or other instrument creating a
lien on property. Given the doctrine of ambiguity, such an assignment probably would be treated as a mortgage or other lien-creating document. The result is that any losses directly caused by
Happyvale's good faith reliance on counterfeit mortgage assignments would indeed be covered under the Securities Insuring
Agreement.
Happyvale will argue, therefore, that the mortgage assignments
signed in blank or sold to more than one financial institution were
counterfeit. The bank's argument should fail because the bond defines counterfeit as "an imitation which is intended to deceive and
its correspondent bank or other authorized representative, is a condition precedent to the
Insured's having relied on the faith of, or otherwise acted upon, such items.
A mechanically reproduced facsimile signature is treated the same as a handwritten
signature.
BOND LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 9.
126. See supra notes 102-24 and accompanying text.
127. BOND LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 9. See supra note 125.
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to be taken as an original.' 28 Recent case law is, for the most
part, consistent with this definition. The majority of jurisdictions
hold that the presence of false or fraudulent information within an
instrument or surrounding its sale or assignment does not render 29
it
counterfeit unless it imitates a genuine original instrument.
Under this definition of counterfeit, none of the documents on
which Happyvale relied would be deemed counterfeit because they
were not imitations fraudulently passed off as genuine originals. If
a court held otherwise, South Brook could still avoid exposure by
establishing that Happyvale's reliance was not undertaken in
''good faith."

B.

Good Faith and the Doctrine of "Selective Ignorance"

Few cases have directly addressed the requirement of good faith
reliance under the blanket bond's Securities Insuring Agreement.
Initially, those courts that addressed the issue embraced a subjective standard that favored coverage. Recent decisions, however,
are moving toward an objective standard that is more favorable to
the insurer.
Prior to the late 1970s, the only certainty surrounding the good
faith requirement was that an insurer could not defeat coverage
128. Bond Litigation, supra note 5, at 10.
129. See First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 347
F.2d 945, 947 (10th Cir. 1965). According to the First NationalBank court:
[Tihe majority of courts which have encountered this problem have held [that]
fictitious invoices and accounts receivable cannot be considered counterfeit
within the meaning of Insuring Clause (E). These courts in general agree that
the term 'counterfeit' means an imitation of an authentic document or writing
or a resemblance intended to deceive and to be taken for the original.
Id. Accord Capitol Bank of Chicago v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 414 F.2d 986
(7th Cir. 1969); Union Banking Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 4 Ohio App.
397, 213 N.E.2d 191 (1965); Allied Bank Int'l v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., N.YL.J, Aug.
11, 1988, at 18. col. 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 2, 1988). See also Whitney Nat'l Bank v.
Transamerica Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 632, 634 (3d Cir. 1973); North Carolina Nat'l Bank, v.
United States Casualty Co., 317 F.2d 304 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 905 (1963);
First Nat'l Bank of Memphis v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 309 F.2d 702, 705 (6th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 953 (1963); State Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Maryland Casualty
Co., 289 F.2d 544, 548 (8th Cir. 1961); Exchange Nat'l Bank of Olean v. Insurance Co. of
N. Am., 341 F.2d 673, 676 (2d Cir. 1955); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. First
Nat'l Bank of Fort Morgan, 147 Colo. 446, 452, 364 P.2d 202, 206 (1961); Gateway State
Bank v. North River Ins. Co., 387 N.W.2d 344 (Iowa 1986); William Iselin & Co. v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 69 N.Y.2d 908, 508 N.E.2d 932, 516 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1987);
State Bank of Kenmore v. Hanover Ins. Co., 49 Misc. 2d 341, 343-44, 267 N.Y.S.2d 672,
674-75 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965), aff'd, 25 A.D.2d 604, 269 N.Y.S.2d 388 (N.Y. App. Div.
1966); Annotation, Wat Are "Securities, Documents or Other Written Instruments"
Within Terms ofBanker's Blanket Bond Insuring Losses from Counterfeiting or Forgery,
38 A.L.R.3D 1437 (1971).
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merely by establishing that the insured's ordinary negligence
caused or facilitated its loss. 3 o This rule derived from the common
law doctrine that one should not benefit from or insure against the
consequences of his own intentional misconduct."' This is not the
130. In First National Bank of Fort Walton Beach v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 416 F.2d 52 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 417 F.2d 1339 (5th Cir. 1969), for example,
a blanket bond carrier unsuccessfully defended a coverage action by asserting that the
insured failed to investigate the authenticity of securities collateralizing a series of loans.
The court stressed that negligence alone could not overcome the requirement of good
faith reliance demanded by Insuring Clause (E):
Ordinary negligence, without more, does not convert good faith into bad. Had
negligence been intended as a good defense to payment for injuries covered by
[Insuring Clause] (E), it should have been set out in the agreement.
Id. at 57 (citations omitted). The court in Citizens Bank of Oregon v. American Insurance Co., 289 F. Supp. 211 (D. Ore. 1968), went further. In Citizens Bank of Oregon, the
insured bank made loans that were collateralized by forged stock certificates, and the
court held that ordinary negligence was no defense to coverage under the securities insuring agreement. Id. at 214. Although the court explored the meaning of "good faith," its
comments were cryptic. The court stated:
'Honesty' is good faith. 'Dishonesty' is bad faith .... Of course, want of due
care has nothing to do with honesty or dishonesty ....
A Bankers Blanket
Bond, such as the one before me, was involved in First NationalBank of Crandon v. United States F & G. Co. of Baltimore, 150 Wis. 601, 137 N.W. 742, in
which the Court held that mere negligence on the part of the insured which
resulted in loss is not a defense to an action on the bond, unless such negligence
amounts to fraud or bad faith.
Id. at 214.
The court's statement that simple negligence was insufficient to overcome a finding of
'good faith' reliance was unobjectionable. Its suggestion, however, that fraud, dishonesty
or bad faith is required was entirely without support. The court relied on Crandon,
which was decided under a fidelity insuring clause rather than on the securities insuring
agreement. First Nat'l Bank of Crandon v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 150 Wis.
601, 137 N.W. 742 (1912). In Crandon, the record established that the bank's loss was
caused by the fraud and dishonesty of an employee and was therefore covered under the
terms of the bond's fidelity insuring clause. Id. at 603, 137 N.W. at 743. The court
rejected the insurer's defense that the bank was negligent in failing to discover and abort
its employee's participation in a check kiting operation, noting that "mere negligence" is
one of the risks covered by such insurance, and that only fraud, subjective bad faith, or
dishonesty on the part of the insured could be a valid defense to coverage under the
fidelity clause. Id. at 610, 137 N.W. at 745.
131. See, e.g., St. Paul Ins. Cos. v. Talladega Nursing Home, 606 F.2d 631, 633 (5th
Cir. 1979); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Title Guar. Co., 520 F.2d 1170, 1175 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Hoyle, 64 F.2d 413, 415 (4th Cir. 1933); Seiffer
v. Topsy's Int'l, 487 F. Supp. 653, 708 (D. Kan. 1980); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Michigan
Mut. Liab. Co., 259 F. Supp. 606, 609 (W.D. Va. 1966); American Ins. Co. v. Saulnier,
242 F. Supp. 257, 261 (D. Conn. 1965); Portaro v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 210
F. Supp. 411, 416 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 310 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1962). Compare FDIC v.
National Sur. Corp., 434 F. Supp. 61, 63 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) with First Nat'l Bank of Columbus v. Hansen, 84 Wis. 2d 422, 430-31, 267 N.W.2d 367, 371 (1978). See also FDIC
v. Lott, 460 F.2d 82, 87-88 (5th Cir. 1972); Comment, The Nature and Extent of Subrogation Rights of Fidelity Insurers Against Officers and Directorsof FinancialInstitutions,
47 U. PiTT. L. REV. 727 (1978).
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same doctrine reflected in the requirement of good faith reliance in
Insuring Clause (E). Simply put, the courts improperly equated
Insuring Agreement (E)'s affirmative requirement of good faith
with the common law rule that the insured's bad faith defeats coverage.1 32 The common law doctrine that an insured may not benefit from the consequences of its wrongdoing applies to all contracts
of insurance, 1 3 whereas Insuring Agreement (E)'s requirement of
good faith reliance is created exclusively by the express terms of
that clause. Thus, if good faith means nothing more than the absence of bad faith, then its inclusion in Insuring Clause (E) would
be superfluous.
First National Bank of Decatur v. Insurance Co. of North
America 131 was one of the earliest blanket bond decisions to recognize that good faith means more than the absence of subjective bad
faith. Even though the court determined that the insured acted in
good faith, it reformulated the test by treating good faith as commercial reasonableness.' 35 The Decatur court considered whether
the insured reasonably should have known of the existence of the
false pretenses that caused the loss. The Decatur decision was,
thus, a harbinger of more recent decisions that have addressed the
requirement of good faith reliance.
Recent cases construing the Securities Insuring Agreement have
expanded the objective standard to include the doctrine of selective
ignorance. For example, in Marsh Investment Corp. v. Langford,'3 6
132. See, e.g., Citizens Bank of Oregon v. American Ins. Co., 289 F. Supp. 211, 214
(D. Or. 1968).
133. Id.
134. 424 F.2d 312 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 939 (1970) [hereinafter Decatur].
Although the case did not implicate an insuring agreement whose coverage was conditioned on the insured's exercise of good faith reliance, the carrier nonetheless raised the
insured's lack of good faith (but not the presence of bad faith) as a defense to coverage.
Id. at 316.
135. Id. The court stated:
[W]e are not persuaded that the [insured] knew or reasonably should have
known that such difficulties had pressed an apparently respected corporation
into activities that amounted to a violation of the criminal law of Illinois. As
soon as it learnedfacts which gave a hint of such activity, it froze Community's
account. Accordingly, we hold that [the insured] is not precluded from a recovery on the instant bond on the ground that it failed to exercise commercial
'good faith.'
Id. (emphasis added). Although the Decatur court correctly advanced the definition of
"good faith" as a precondition to coverage under certain insuring clauses in a blanket
bond, the court mistakenly applied the "good faith" requirement to the facts of the case.
The court was mistaken because the policy being construed contained no provision requiring "good faith" as a precondition to coverage. Id. at 315.
136. 554 F. Supp. 800 (E.D. La. 1982), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 721 F.2d
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the insured bank cancelled a substantial indebtedness in exchange
for a mortgage on a corporation's property. The instrument that
memorialized the substituted obligation was executed by an individual whom the bank knew was not an officer, director, or a
shareholder of the corporation. The bank possessed this knowledge because the individual's own attorney had refused to represent him as such at the bank's request. The bank, which sustained
a loss because the individual was judgment-proof and the corporation not bound by his signature, sought reimbursement under the
Securities Insuring Clause of its Bankers Blanket Bond. 37 The insurer denied coverage on the ground that the bank had not met the
and in subsequent coverage litiprecondition of good faith reliance,
1 3
1
agreed.
court
district
gation, the
In reaching its decision, the Marsh Investment Corp. court noted
that actions taken out of ignorance or negligence may have been
taken in good faith. But when a person chooses to remain ignorant
and disregards suspicious circumstances, a court may not deem his
subsequent conduct as the product of good faith. "Selective ignorance," the court held, should not "satisfy the good faith requirement for coverage."' 39 The court proceeded to chronicle each
1011 (5th Cir. 1983). Although the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's finding that
there was no good faith reliance under the doctrine of selective ignorance, the appellate
court did not expressly approve the doctrine. In the district court, the bank conceded that
the doctrine of selective ignorance should be applied to determine whether the precondition of good faith reliance was satisfied. The Fifth Circuit accepted this concession and
left "for another day any definitive pronouncement on this vexed question of state law."
Id. at 1014. See also Stix Friedman & Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 563 S.W.2d
517 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). In Stix Friedman, the court affirmed the following jury
instruction:
The Court instructs the jury that 'good faith' means freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put a person upon inquiry. This includes the
exercise of reasonable discretion under the circumstances, and an honest effort
to ascertain the facts and to make a determination based on such ascertained
facts.
Id. at 521. See also General Inv. Corp. v. Angelini, 58 N.J. 396, 405, 278 A.2d 193, 197
(1971) ("Absence of inquiry under the circumstances amounts to an intentional closing of
the eyes and mind to any defects in or defenses to the transaction").
137. Marsh Inv. Corp., 554 F. Supp. at 801-03.
138. Id. at 805-06. The Marsh Investment Corp. court applied a standard of commercial reasonableness similar to the one used to define "good faith" in the Uniform Commercial Code. See Jordan, Holder in Due Course, in BASIC UCC SKILLS 1987: ARTICLE
3 AND ARTICLE 4, 45, 52-60 (Practicing Law Institute 1987); J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, supra note 51, § 14-6, at 562-68; Rohner, Holder in Due Course in Consumer
Transaction:Requiem, Revival, or Reformation?, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 503 (1975); Annotation, What Constitutes Taking Instrument in Good Faith, and Without Notice of Infirmities or Defenses, to Support Holder-In-Due Course Status, Under UCC § 3-302, 36 A.L.R
4TH 212 (1985).
139. Marsh Inv. Corp., 544 F. Supp. at 805. The doctrine of selective ignorance has a
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suspicious incident in the loan restructuring that should have put
the insured bank on inquiry notice as to the likelihood of future
loss, concluding: "this course of deliberate inaction, of concerted
ignorance, in the face of so many circumstances which fairly cried
out for further investigation and scrutiny, leads me to the ines4
capable conclusion that the Bank did not act in 'good faith'."'10
life beyond the Marsh Investment Corp. case. In French American Banking Corp. v.
Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, 609 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), a bank sustained
loss when it extended a loan collateralized with forged bills of lading. When it sought
reimbursement under its blanket bond, the carrier moved for summary judgment on the
ground that the insured did not proceed in good faith, as required by Insuring Clause (E),
because it failed to investigate adequately the genuineness of the collateral. Id. at 1358.
The court denied the motion for summary judgment because the question of good faith
required further factual development. Id. at 1359. What is significant is that, relying
principally on Marsh Investment Corp., it accepted the doctrine of selective ignorance as
the proper test for determining good faith reliance under the bond's Securities Insuring
Agreement. Id. at 1358-59.
140. Marsh Inv. Corp., 554 F. Supp. at 806. The court went on to cite non-insurance
cases decided under the UCC's standard of commercial reasonableness in which the dispositive question was whether a bank had proceeded in "good faith" in order to prevail as
a holder in due course or a bona fide purchaser for value. Id. (citing Hollywood Nat'l
Bank v. I.B.M., 38 Cal. App. 3d 607, 113 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1974) (bank's refusal to inquire
as to how loan recipient with poor credit rating obtained $70,000 stock certificate to
secure loan supported finding that bank did not act in good faith); Seinfeld v. Commercial
Bank & Trust Co., 405 So. 2d 1039, 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (bank's immediate
clearance of checks from unknown customer without adequate investigation raised issue
of good faith on part of bank); Community Bank v. Ell, 278 Or. 417, 428, 564 P.2d 685,
691, reh'g denied, 279 Or. 245, 566 P.2d 903 (1977) ("[I]f a party fails to make an inquiry
for the purpose of remaining ignorant of acts which he believes or fears would disclose a
defect in the transaction, he may be found to have acted in bad faith")). Outside of the
insurance setting, the doctrine of selective ignorance was expressed in 1971 by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in General Investment Corp. v. Angelini, 58 N.J. 396, 278 A.2d
193 (1971). In Angelini, the issue had to be explored in order to determine whether the
plaintiff was a holder in due course:
The test is neither freedom from negligence in entering into the transaction nor
awareness of circumstances calculated to arouse suspicions either as to whether
the instrument is subject to some defense not appearing on its face or whether
the promise to pay is not as unconditional as it appears therein. However, evidence of circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the note which excite
questions as to whether the obligation it represents is really dependent upon
performance of some duty by the payee is of probative value if it provides some
support for a finding of a bad faith taking by the holder ....Ordinarily, where
the note appears to be negotiable in form and regular on its face, the holder is
under no duty to inquire as to possible defenses such as failure of consideration,
unless the circumstances of which he has knowledge rise to the level that the
failure to inquire reveals a deliberate desire on his part to evade knowledge
because of a belief or fear that investigation would disclose a defense arising
from the transaction. And, in this connection, once it appears that a defense
exists against the payee, the person claiming the rights of a holder in due course
has the burden of establishing that he is in all respects such a holder . . ..
Absence of inquiry under the circumstances amounts to an intentional closing
of the eyes and mind to any defects in or defenses to the transaction.
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On the basis of the cases surveyed, several conclusions can be
reached safely. Whenever an insuring agreement requires good
faith reliance as a precondition to coverage, both the insurer and
the court should look beyond the insured's protestations of ignorance or mere negligence. They should review the facts critically.
If the facts indicate that sufficient warnings existed to cause a reasonable person to inquire further, a failure to inquire may constitute selective ignorance. Selective ignorance should defeat
coverage when good faith reliance is a sine qua non to coverage.
As with the loan exclusion under the on premises insuring clause
and the requirement of direct causation under all the insuring
agreements in the bond, the threshold of good faith reliance in the
Securities Insuring Clause is evidently designed to serve public policy by withholding reimbursement from banks sustaining loss that
could have and should have been avoided in the first place.
C.

Application of the Doctrine of Selective Ignorance To the
Happyvale-Star-SpangledFunding Transactions

South Brook may raise the selective ignorance defense in two
ways. First, as to losses arising from the first three packages of
loans, South Brook may argue that Pokey was selectively ignorant
when he executed the first Home Improvement Loan Participation
Agreement. Pokey negligently failed to realize that, contrary to his
understanding with The Duck, the contract provided that Happyvale would purchase a percentage of the total sales price of each
loan, rather than a percentage of the amount financed. Pokey's
Id. at 403-05, 278 A.2d at 196-97. In corporate law, it is also well established that a
director or officer may not avoid liability for injuries caused by corporate misconduct by
asserting that he was unaware of the improprieties. See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey
Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 31, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (1981) (corporate managers may not "shut their
eyes to corporate misconduct, and then claim that because they did not see the misconduct they did not have a duty to look"); Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New
Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078
(1968). According to Bishop:
The evil of the decoy duck director, whose main function is to give to actual and
potential public investors a false feeling of security, has long been recognized as
real and serious.... Outside directors who do not supervise may be dangerous
in much the same way that a quack cancer cure is dangerous; reliance upon
them inhibits resort to other and more effective remedies.... So far as I know,
it is not a crime to be a director who does not direct; at least I am not aware
that any director has ever been sent to jail for aggravated abdication of his
responsibilities. The only legal deterrent to such conduct, and perhaps the only
substantial deterrent of any sort, is the fear of civil liability.
Id. at 1092-93. Professor Bishop also might have noted that the fear of no coverage
under an insurance policy also may serve as a deterrent to the type of behavior he
criticized.
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negligence was compounded when The Duck's payments were received on the first three packages. At that time, Pokey failed or
refused to recognize that a substantial portion of the cash flow
could not have been generated by payments from the homeowners.
Although Pokey's eyes were undoubtedly closed to these suspicious circumstances, South Brook's argument is, nonetheless, weak
because Scoter drafted the contract and the discrepancy was corrected as soon as Markstone discovered it. Thus, it appears that
Happyvale may have negligently entered into the first three loan
packages, rather than purposely looked the other way. As noted,
negligence in and of itself is an insufficient foundation for a selective ignorance defense."'
South Brook's stronger argument is based on Happyvale's failure to investigate after Markstone returned and realized that the
first three loan packages were purchased pursuant to an incorrect
formula. Because The Duck was not in default, Pokey and Markstone certainly knew by then that approximately one half of the
payments thus far received consisted of funds that could not possibly have been generated by the homeowners. This information
placed them on notice of a highly suspicious set of circumstances.
They should have conducted an investigation and demanded satisfactory answers about the true source of these funds. Absent satisfactory answers, they should not have entered into the remaining
transactions. They also should have exercised the bank's right to
cancel the first three transactions and demanded that The Duck
repurchase the loan participations previously sold.142
141. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
142. It is also possible that the bond may be canceled - at least as to the last seven
loan packages - pursuant to a provision in the Servicing Contractors Endorsement that
provides that "[t]he attached bond shall be deemed canceled as to any Servicing Contractor.., immediately upon discovery by the Insured of any dishonest or fraudulent act on
the part of such Servicing Contractor." CNA Insurance Companies' Servicing Contractors Discovery Form No. G-1 1082-A, revised October, 1983. The standard form provides that "[d]iscovery occurs when the Insured becomes aware of facts which would
cause a reasonable person to assume that a loss covered by the bond has been or will be
incurred, even though the exact amount or details of loss may not then be known." BOND
LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 11 (emphasis added).
South Brook should argue that discovery occurred when Markstone realized the discrepancy in the first three loan packages, because such a realization would have caused a
reasonable person to assume that a covered loss would be incurred. The bond, therefore,
should be deemed canceled prior to the purchase of package four, with the result that loss
caused by the last seven loan packages would be excluded from coverage. This application of the Servicing Contractors Endorsement's cancellation clause, in conjunction with
the bond's definition of discovery, functions essentially the same as the defense of selective ignorance under the securities insuring clause. See City State Bank in Wellington v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 778 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1985); Borden, Termination
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In fact, neither Pokey nor Markstone raised any of these issues
with The Duck. The logical implication is that they chose to look
the other way because the arrangement was, at that time, profitable
and Pokey evidently believed that if anything went wrong, a deeppocketed South Brook would cover any loss. South Brook, therefore, should deny coverage under the securities insuring agreement
on the basis of selective ignorance. Simultaneously or immediately
thereafter, South Brook should commence a declaratory judgment
action against the insured."14 Although South Brook will not get
summary judgment in the absence of discovery, the facts suggest a
strong likelihood that the defense of selective ignorance ultimately
may prevail.'"
VII.

COVERAGE UNDER THE SERVICING CONTRACTORS
ENDORSEMENT

In exchange for an additional premium, a financial institution
may purchase additional insuring agreements in the form of riders
attached to the policy jacket. One such rider, often purchased by
45
banks, is known as the Servicing Contractors Endorsement.
of Coverage, in BANKERS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BLANKET BONDS 461
(A.B.A. 1979); Hayes, Cancellation of the Bond, in THE COMMERCIAL BLANKET BOND
ANNOTATED 163 (A.B.A. 1985); Reinert, Court's Failure to Terminate Coverage Where
Owner Knows of Dishonesty, 11 FORUM 1014 (1976); Schoonover, Discovery, Notice and
Automatic Cancellation Under Revised Form 24, 16 FORUM 962 (1981).
143. See Howard, Apportioning An Insurer's Liability Between Covered And Noncovered Parties and Claims, 38 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 319, 344 n.65 (1988). But
see A. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES: REPRESENTATION OF INSURANCE

COMPANIES AND INSUREDS §§ 8.01-8.14, at 416-40 (2d ed. 1988); Ericson, Declaratory
Judgment: Is It A Real Or Illusory Solution? 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 161 (1987).
144. That Valentino was known as "The Duck," eschewed the use of telephones, and
refused to appear in public places should further aid South Brook's selective ignorance
defense. Although these facts are insufficient, in and of themselves, as grounds for denying coverage, they will combine with the discrepancy in the first three packages of loans
to support the conclusion that Pokey and Markstone closed their eyes in the face of
circumstances that demanded further investigation and scrutiny. They chose to believe
that the duck was a swan.
145. The insuring portion of the Servicing Contractors Endorsement provides:
It is agreed that:
1. The attached bond is hereby amended by adding an additional Insuring Agreement
as follows:
"Servicing Contractors"
A. Loss through any dishonest or fraudulent act committed by any Servicing Contractor, as hereinafter defined, acting alone or in collusion with others.
Dishonest or fraudulent acts as used in this Insuring Agreement shall mean any dishonest or fraudulent acts committed by such Servicing Contractor with the manifest intent:
(a) to cause the Insured to sustain such loss; and
(b) to obtain financial benefit for the Servicing Contractor or for any other person or

Bankers Blanket Bond Coverage

1988]

This endorsement provides coverage for loss caused by a servicing
contractor's fraud or dishonesty or his failure to remit money collected for the insured's account. 4 6 The endorsement defines a
"servicing contractor" as a person or entity, other than an officer
or employee of the insured, that is authorized to collect and record
home improvement loans on behalf of the insured.
Coverage provided by the Servicing Contractors Endorsement
may be analyzed in two ways. First, the standard form's loan exclusion, or the virtually identical loan exclusion in the endorsement
itself, may preclude or reduce coverage for the same reasons coverage would be eliminated or reduced by application of the loan exclusion to the on premises insuring agreement.' 47 Alternatively, a
strict construction of the term "servicing contractor" may preclude
coverage to the extent that Happyvale's losses are not attributable
to The Duck's acts or omissions in his capacity as a servicing
contractor.
A.

Application of the Loan Exclusion
The loan exclusion in the standard form applies with full force to
the Servicing Contractors Endorsement. Moreover, the endorsement itself contains its own loan exclusion which is virtually identical to the first clause of the loan exclusion in the policy jacket.' "1
organization intended by the Servicing Contractor to receive such benefit, other than
salaries, commissions, fees, bonuses, promotions, awards, profit sharing, pensions or
other employee benefits earned in the normal course of employment or performance of
the servicing contract.
B. Loss of money (including obligations of the United States of America) collected or
received for the Insured by any such Servicing Contractor through the failure of such
Servicing Contractor to pay to the Insured the money so collected or received as is discovered to be due and payable while this Insuring Agreement is in force, except, however,
money disbursed by such Servicing Contractor in accordance with instructions from the
Insured.
The term Servicing Contractor, as used in this bond shall mean a natural person, partnership or corporation, other than an officer or employee of the Insured, duly authorized
by the Insured to perform any or all of the following:
(a) collect and record payments on real estate mortgage or home improvement loans
made, held or assigned to the insured, and establish tax and insurance escrow accounts,
(b) manage real property owned by or under the supervision or control of the Insured,
(c) perform other acts directly related to the above,
but only while such natural person, partnership or corporation is actually performing
such services within the United States of America, the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico or
Canada.
CNA, supra note 4.
146. Id.
147. See BOND LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 10.
148. The exclusions section of the Servicing Contractors Endorsement provides:
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Therefore, regardless of which exclusion is applied, the result will
be the same. Because the two loan exclusions are so similar, the
foregoing coverage analysis of the standard form's loan exclusion
will be dispositive. 149 If South Brook can convince a court that
Happyvale's loss was caused directly or indirectly by Valentino's
failure to repay loans from the bank, then coverage will be
denied. 150
B.

Definition of Servicing Contractor

Under the Home Improvement Loan Participation Agreements,
Valentino undoubtedly was a servicing contractor because he was
paid to collect and record the homeowners' payments and remit a
portion of these funds to Happyvale. Although it is evident that
The Duck was a servicing contractor, it is equally evident that he
acted distinctly as a seller or assignor of promissory notes and
mortgage assignments, or as a borrower of funds."'1 These addiIn addition to the exclusions in the attached bond, the Servicing Contractors
Insuring Agreement does not cover:
(a) Loss resulting from the insolvency, bankruptcy or taking over by a receiver or other liquidator or by the State or Federal Officials of any depository
institution, unless such depository is a Servicing Contractor covered under this
bond and unless such insolvency, bankruptcy or taking over results from fraud
or dishonesty of officers or employees of such depository institution, or
(b) Under paragraph (B) [Le., loss through failure to remit collected funds],
loss through the failure of any Servicing Contractor covered under this bond to
collect or receive Money for the account of the Insured, any agreement between
such Servicing Contractor and the Insured to the contrary notwithstanding, or
(c) Under paragraph (B), loss of Money collected or received for the account
of the Insured by any Servicing Contractor covered under this bond unless such
Servicing Contractor is legally liable to the Insured on account of the loss of
such Money, or
(d) Loss resulting directly or indirectly from the complete or partial non-payment of, or default upon, any loan or transaction in the nature of a loan or
extension of credit made to a Servicing Contractor, including any such loan or
transaction established to provide funds for the interim financing or 'warehousing' of mortgage loans, whether procured in good faith or through fraud or false
pretenses, or loss resulting directly or indirectly from the failure of the Servicing
Contractor to pay over Property held as security for any such loan or
transaction.
CNA, supra note 4, at § 2.
149. See supra notes 66-101 and accompanying text.
150. For purposes of applying the Servicing Contractors Endorsement, it is not important to distinguish between Valentino, the individual, and Star-Spangled Funding, the
corporation. The endorsement provides that "[tihe term Servicing Contractor shall include the partners, officers and employees of such Contractors and each such Servicing
Contractor and its partners, officers and employees shall collectively be deemed to be one
person for [purposes of applying the limit of liability]." CNA, supra note 4, at § l(b).
151. The Duck acted as a borrower if the transaction is construed as a loan.
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tional capacities have significant coverage implications.
When the same person or entity wears two or more hats, the
coverage analysis should be no different than if a different person
or entity wore each hat. 15 2 This is because the endorsement defines
a servicing contractor in functional, rather than nominal terms. In
effect, the Home Improvement Loan Participation Agreements
were two separate contracts. Under one contract, Valentino either
sold or assigned notes to Happyvale or he borrowed money from
Happyvale. Under the other contract, Happyvale retained Valentino solely to service the home improvement loans (i.e. to collect,
record and remit payments). Although South Brook is arguably
responsible for loss caused by The Duck's acts or omissions as a
servicing contractor, losses arising from his acts or omissions undertaken in another capacity should not trigger coverage under the
rider. As a result, it is critical to determine in what capacity The
Duck acted with respect to each category of loss.
Loss caused by loans prepaid in full would trigger coverage only
if Valentino was obligated to prepay Happyvale in the event a
homeowner prepaid him. If such an obligation existed, then the
loss arguably would be covered under both parts of the endorsement, because it would have been caused by The Duck's fraud as a
servicing contractor, as well as by his failure as a servicing contractor, to remit collected funds to Happyvale. Such loss would not
trigger coverage if Valentino had no mirror-image prepayment obligation. In that event, the loss would have resulted from the
breach of his obligation to repay Happyvale, on a monthly basis,
principal, plus sixteen percent interest. 53 The loss, therefore,
152. This concept was emphasized recently in the context of insurance company liquidation proceedings. When an insurer is adjudicated insolvent and placed in liquidation,
the state's Insurance Commissioner is appointed by the court to serve as the statutory
receiver of the defunct corporation. Notwithstanding the fact that the same person will
occupy both roles, the positions themselves must be treated as legally distinct. Hence, if
the liquidator commences an action against the insurer's former directors and officers, he
may not interpose the affirmative defense of contributory or comparative negligence by
asserting that the Insurance Commissioner earlier failed to discover that the company
was in a hazardous financial condition. Such a defense may be raised only against the
plaintiff and the plaintiff is the liquidator, rather than the Commissioner, even though the
same person occupies both roles. In re Liquidation of Ideal Mut. Ins. Co., 140 App. Div.
2d 62, 532 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1988); Corcoran v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 143 A.D. 2d
309, 532 N.Y.S.2d 376 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). With regard to the relationship between
commissioners and liquidators in general, see Howard, How to Fail at Liquidating an
Insurance Company without Really Trying: Appoint a Policyholders' Committee, 39 FED'N
INS. & CORP. CouNs. Q. 31, 33-39 (1988); Howard, Uncle Sam Versus the Insurance
Commissioners.-A Multi-Level Approach to Defining the "Business of Insurance" under the
McCarran-FergusonAct, 25 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 7-14 (1989).
153. Assuming that Valentino had no obligation to pay Happyvale with funds re-
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would be attributable to Valentino's breach of his obligations to
Happyvale in his capacity as seller or assignor of commercial paper
or as a borrower of funds.
In fact, the Home Improvement Loan Agreements did not impose any mirror-image prepayment obligations. Loss related to
loans prepaid in full was unrelated to Valentino's function as a
servicing contractor and therefore falls outside the coverage provisions of the Servicing Contractors Endorsement.
Similarly, South Brook should not cover loss caused by The
Duck's fraudulent completion of instruments signed in blank or his
multiple pledging of the same promissory notes and mortgage assignments. South Brook should not cover these losses because they
were caused by Valentino's fraudulent acts as a seller or assignor of
commercial paper, rather than as a servicing contractor.
For similar reasons, South Brook should not cover the portion of
Happyvale's loss that the delinquent homeowners caused. If Happyvale's loss resulted from Valentino's false representation that no
homeowners were chronically delinquent in repaying their debts,
then he caused the loss in his capacity as seller or assignor of commercial paper, rather than as a servicing contractor. If the loss
resulted from Happyvale's inability or unwillingness to enforce the
notes or foreclose on the mortgages, then the loss was again unrelated to The Duck's role as a servicing contractor. Finally, if the
loss resulted from the borrowers' continued default after Valentino's disappearance in October 1983, then the loss also was unrelated to his acts or omissions as a servicing contractor because he
ceased to service anything after October 1983, except perhaps the
fishes. 154
In sum, Happyvale's claim is not covered by the Servicing Contractors Endorsement. To the extent that the bank's loss resulted
from Valentino's default on a loan from Happyvale, the loan excluceived from the homeowners, coverage for loss based on unremitted collections might
also be excluded under the endorsement's third exclusion. The third exclusion bars coverage for loss of money collected by the contractor when he is not legally liable to the
insured as a result of the loss of such money. See supra note 148.
154. Any loss arguably caused by The Duck's failure to service the loans actually was
caused by mere breach of contract. Valentino breached his contractual obligation to collect funds from the homeowners and failed to pay the principal plus 16% interest to
Happyvale on a monthly basis. Breach of contract does not constitute fraud by a servicing contractor. Similarly, it does not constitute failure to remit collected funds because
the funds never were collected in the first place. See supra notes 145, 148. Consequently,
no matter what category of loss is subjected to analysis, the conclusion should be that
such loss was not caused by the acts or omissions of a servicing contractor and, therefore,
is not covered by the rider.
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sion in the bond or endorsement eliminates coverage. Moreover,
Valentino did not cause Happyvale's loss in his capacity as a servicing contractor by engaging in fraud or failing to remit money
collected for Happyvale. Absent this indispensable causal link, the
endorsement is of no use to the bank under these circumstances.
VIII.
A.

ADDITIONAL PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Multiple Applications of the Bonds's Deductible

Every blanket bond contains a deductible or self-insured retention. Assuming that the deductible is applied once for each separate loss, there is authority to support the assertion that each loan
gives rise to a separate loss and that the insurer may, therefore,
apply the deductible once for each loan-related loss.' 5 Depending
on the amount of each loan, the amount of the deductible, and the
amount of each loan-related loss, the multiple deductible argument
could either eliminate or reduce coverage.
There are several drawbacks to employing the multiple deductible argument. Most notably, the blanket bond does not clearly
state that the deductible applies once for each loss.'56 The bond
also fails to state clearly what conduct constitutes a single loss for
purposes of applying the deductible. 5 " Therefore, a court may employ the doctrine of ambiguity to reject multiple deductibles and
maximize coverage. 158

Equitable considerations increase the likelihood that a court
155. See North River Ins. Co. v. Huff, 628 F. Supp. 1129, 1133 (D. Kan. 1985) (three
transactions that comprised one "loan swap" were all separate occurrences); General
Casualty of Am. v. Gunion, 99 A.2d 643 (D.C. 1953) (each of five fraudulent loans made
by same person gives rise to a separate loss); Slater v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
7 Mass. App. 281, 400 N.E.2d 1256 (1980) (each defalcation by same employee over a 15
month period is a separate occurrence); Burlington County Abstract Co. v. QMA Assocs., Inc., 167 N.J. Super. 398, 400 A.2d 1211 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 81 N.J. 280, 405
A.2d 824 (1979) (deductible should be applied to each of 84 occurrences that took place
over a two-year period); Humboldt Trust & Sav. Bank v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of
N.Y., 255 Iowa 524, 122 N.W.2d 358 (1963) (eight forgeries over two years were separate
occurrences). But see Business Interiors, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty Co., 751 F.2d 361 (10th
Cir. 1984) (thirty-nine acts of forgery by one employee over seven-month period constitutes a single occurrence under blanket bond).
156.

BOND LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 10-11.

157. Id.
158. The Declarations Page of the 1980 bond references a "deductible," with a blank
space beneath that word to be filled in with the appropriate dollar amount for each insuring agreement. Any ambiguity has been removed in the 1986 revision, whose Declarations Page substitutes the term "Single Loss Deductible." Id. at 8, 20. Notwithstanding
this revision, the 1986 bond's definition of a single loss, much like the 1980 bond's definition of deductible amount, is sufficiently ambiguous that it provides little guidance for
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would find the deductible provisions ambiguous and, thus, reject
the multiple deductible argument. Most courts that embrace the
idea that each loan results in a separate loss do so to multiply the
limit of liability and thereby increase coverage. 159 In contrast,
South Brook would invoke this concept to substantially reduce or
eliminate coverage. The final drawback to the multiple deductible
argument is that it may detract from the credibility of stronger
arguments.
Despite these caveats, an insurer should set forth the multiple
deductible argument in a reservation of rights letter, in a denial of
coverage, and as an affirmative defense to a coverage action commenced by the insured. Whether a bonding company should use it
in a declaratory judgment action commenced against the insured is
determining whether a servicing contractor has caused one large loss or a series of smaller
losses.
The standard form is far more specific with respect to the definition of a single loss for
purposes of applying the limit of liability. Section 3 of the "Conditions and Limitations"
portion of the bond provides in pertinent part that with respect to acts other than burglary, robbery, and misplacement of, or damage or destruction to property, all related
acts committed by the same person shall constitute a single loss. Id. at 11. Thus, for
purposes of applying the limit of liability, the loss Happyvale sustained due to Valentino's
acts would be deemed a single loss. In the liability insurance context, courts have applied
this same definition of a single loss applicable to defining the limit of liability to determine
the number of losses for purposes of applying a per loss deductible. Liability insurance
policies provide that a series of interrelated acts (or of continuous or repeated exposure to
the same general conditions) shall be deemed a single loss or occurrence for the purpose
of limiting the insurer's liability to a single limit of liability as set forth in the declarations. Most courts also use this provision to determine the number of losses or occurrences for purposes of applying the deductible, notwithstanding the fact that the
provision, by its own terms, is limited to reducing the insurer's liability. See Hobel, Current Insurance Litigation, TECHNIQUES OF SELF-INSURANCE 1987: CORPORATE SURVIVAL IN A WORLD WITH INADEQUATE COMMERCIAL INSURANCE 301, 331-34
(Practicing Law Institute 1987); Howard, Apportioning an Insurer's Liability Between
Covered and Noncovered PartiesAnd Claims, 38 FED'N INS. & CORP. COuNS. Q. 319, 349
(1988); Liederman, Application of Occurrence/Accident to an Insurer'sLimit of Liability

and Deductible, in THE

COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY: A CRITIQUE OF

SELECTED PROVISIONS

113 (A.B.A. Tort & Ins. Prac. Sec. 1985). Courts have co-opted

this definition of a "single loss" to provide added protection to the insured. They apply
this definition because it almost always leads to a single loss and, thus, only one application of the deductible. One court has refused to apply the definition for purposes of
determining the number of deductibles, on the ground that it was limited in application to
the limit of liability. Cf Burlington County Abstract Co., 167 N.J. Super. at 398, 400
A.2d at 824; Wurth v. Ideal Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Ohio App. 3d 325, 330, 518 N.E.2d 607,
612 (1987) ("[a]n insurer is entitled to have the titles provided to the various sections of
its policy recognized by a court in interpreting those sections").
159. See W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, supra note 2, § 21.11, at 713-16. But see Roodhouse Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 426 F.2d 1347, 1350-51 (7th Cir.
1970); SEC v. Arkansas Loan & Thrift Co., 297 F. Supp. 73, 79-80 (D. Ark. 1969), aff'd,
427 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1970); Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v Aetna Ins. Co., 279 F.
Supp. 161, 163-64 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
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a matter for individual judgment based on the facts of the case, the
applicable law, and the track record of the court in which the action has been brought.
B.

Offsets

To the extent that Happyvale's loss is covered in whole or in
part (or the carrier, notwithstanding a firm conviction that there is
no coverage, makes a business decision to settle rather than litigate), South Brook should deduct from Happyvale's claim certain
funds that Happyvale received as a result of its transactions with
Valentino. These offsets would include, among other things: the
value of any property the bank received from executing on Valentino's or Star-Spangled Funding's assets; the servicing contractor's
fees on all loans, whether or not they formed the basis for Happyvale's claim under its Bankers Blanket Bond; and, any payments
received by the bank from homeowners after October 1983.
Happyvale, in all likelihood, will object to this offsetting concept. It probably will assert that it is entitled to retain the servicing
contractor's fee because, by virtue of The Duck's breach of contract, Happyvale was forced to service the loans itself. Happyvale
may even seek to increase its claim by adding any fees and disbursements of counsel retained to assist in its collection efforts
against delinquent borrowers.160
Although South Brook may sympathize with the bank's plight,
it must assert that, pursuant to the provisions of the insurance contract, such expenses are not entitled to consideration in determining the amount of Happyvale's claim. 161 Such conflicts between
policyholders and insurance companies may serve a useful function
in settlement negotiations. Although counsel for the bank and the
bonding company will both realize that the issue is relatively in160. The bond might proscribe Happyvale's collection actions because if Happyvale
settled with a third party debtor (e.g., a homeowner) for less than the full amount due,
then such a settlement would invalidate the bonding company's subrogation rights
against the debtor. In theory, the insurer, after paying a claim, could exact the full
amount of the debt owed by the third party. See BOND LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 11;
Comment, The Nature and Extent of Subrogation Rights of Fidelity InsurersAgainst Of-

ficers and Directorsof FinancialInstitutions, 47 U. PITr. L. REV. 727 (1986). In practice,
however, large insurers are probably not interested in hiring counsel to recover a substantial number of small debts originally owed by many debtors to the insured, because the
cost of prosecuting collection actions is frequently not worth the amounts that may be
collected. The benefit to the surety is further reduced because collection lawyers generally charge on a contingency basis, retaining a substantial percentage of any debt collected from each separate piece of litigation.
161. BOND LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 11.
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consequential, a bargaining victory on this point may persuade a
reluctant client to settle, rather than litigate, based on the illusion
that he has received something to which he was not strictly entitled

as a matter of law.
C. Impleading Pokey and Markstone
If South Brook denies coverage and Happyvale brings suit
against South Brook, then the bonding company should consider
joining Pokey and Markstone as third-party defendants. South
Brook can argue that their negligence caused, facilitated, or contributed to the bank's loss. Although they may have been far less
culpable than The Duck, they were more culpable than South
Brook. It is, therefore, equitable for them to assume or at least
share in any loss sustained by South Brook.
Jurisdictions are split on whether a bonding company may engage in such third-party practice. Many courts are reluctant to
allow impleader because it shifts all or part of the bonding company's exposure to the bank's managers and, through them, to it's
Directors and Officers ("D & 0") liability insurer. 6 2 Because it is
well-settled that the bonding company may not assert a claim
against its insured on the basis of the bank's mere negligence, cases
proscribing such third-party practice tend to equate the D & O's
with the bank they serve. These decisions stress that a bank may
162. A D & 0 policy provides coverage for loss caused by the negligence of the financial institution's officers and directors. See generally W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, supra
note 2, § 21.18, at 685-741; Howard, supra note 46, at 163; Ichel & Thompson, supra note
76, at 220; Miller & Johnston, An Analysis of Key Provisions of Directors and Officers
Liability Insurance Policies, in THE CRISIS IN DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY
INSURANCE 37 (1986); Oettle & Howard, supra note 58, at 337; Sullivan & Barry, The
Directorsand Officers Liability Policy: An Overview, 55 DEF. COUNS. J. 248 (1988); Note,
The D & 0 Insurance Crisis: Darkness at the End of the Tunnel, 39 S.C.L. REV. 653
(1988); Note, Disbursementof InsuranceMoney Covering an Insured's Legal Expenses as
Incurred, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 467 (1988). If the same insurer issued a blanket bond
and a D & 0 policy to the same insured, which is not unlikely, then such third-party
practice realistically would not occur because the same insurer would for all intents and
purposes be suing itself. In theory, however, this might not result in a wash if the type
and quantum of reinsurance on each policy was significantly different. The directors and
officers of a financial institution should, therefore, make a concerted effort to purchase a
D & 0 liability policy and a financial institution bond from the same insurance company.
Although this will generally result in lower aggregate premiums, the directors and officers
should proceed in the same fashion even if the result is a slight increase in aggregate
premiums. Nevertheless, if the difference in premiums is substantial, then the directors
and officers risk being accused of breaching their fiduciary duties to the institution. See
W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, supra note 2, at §§ 1.04-1.06, 12.01-12.18.
With respect to the relationship between D & 0 and bond coverage, see Eglin National
Bank v. Home Indemnity Co., 583 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1978).
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act only through its D & Os, whose conduct will be imputed to the
institution. 63 Courts that allow impleader distinguish the directors and officers from the institution. They stress that under principles of equitable and contractual subrogation, the carrier may
proceed against any responsible party whom the bank could sue
and that a bank may sue its own directors and officers for loss
caused by their negligence." The ability of the bank itself to recover from its D & 0 insurer is considerably reduced because of
the presence of "insured versus insured" exclusions in most recently-issued D & 0 policies.' 65 The "insured versus insured" exclusion eliminates D & 0 coverage for loss resulting from
litigation in which a corporation or financial institution sues its
own directors or officers. 166
The likelihood that South Brook's third-party action against
163. For cases holding that such third-party practice will not be permitted, see Dixie
National Bank of Dade County v. Employers Commercial Union Insurance Co. of
America, 759 F.2d 826 (11 th Cir. 1985) (same for gross negligence); Federal Savings &
Loan Insurance Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, No. 840067-G(M) (S.D. Cal.
June 11, 1985); Plaza Del Sol National Bank v. Fireman's Insurance Co., No. 78-073-B
(D.N.M. Apr. 20, 1979); Dixie National Bank of Dade County v. Carney, 463 So. 2d
1147 (Fla. 1985); First National Bank of Columbus v. Hansen, 84 Wis. 2d 422, 267
N.W.2d 367 (1978). See also Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co., 696 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D. Tenn. 1988) (allowing impleader only if directors or officers
personally profited as a result of their negligence); Rizk, Bank Directors' Liability to Fidelity Insurers: How "Bad" is Bad Faith? 19 FORUM 481 (1984)(takes position that Ds &
Os should be liable only for fraud or bad faith, but that gross negligence, recklessness, or
selective ignorance may, under some circumstances, constitute "bad faith"); Comment,
The Nature and Extent of Subrogation Rights of Fidelity Insurers Against Officers and
Directors of FinancialInstitutions,47 U. PITT. L. REV. 727 (1986) (surveys case law and
takes position that surety should not have subrogation rights against negligent directors
and officers).
164. For cases holding or suggesting that such third-party practice is permissible, see
Germantown Savings Bank v. United Pacific Insurance Co., No. 84-5639 (E.D. Pa. July
31, 1985); Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co. of St. Louis v. Transamerica Insurance Co.,
568 F. Supp. 790 (E.D. Mo. 1983); Community Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
Transamerica Insurance Co., 559 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Mo. 1983); FDIC v. National
Surety Corp., 434 F. Supp. 61 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Standard Accident Insurance Co. v.
Pellecchia, 15 N.J. 162, 104 A.2d 288 (1954); Luzeme National Bank v. Hanover Insurance Co., No. 3600-C (Court of Common Pleas, Luzerne County, Pa. Feb. 3, 1987).
165. See Howard, supra note 46, at 170 n.26. Although it is well-established that a
subrogated surety may not exercise any rights greater than those possessed by the bank to
whose claims it has become subrogated, it is an open question as to whether the surety's
rights are also limited by contractual limitations imposed on the bank pursuant to the
terms of its D & 0 liability policy. See American Casualty Co. v. FDIC, 677 F. Supp.
600, 604-07 (N.D. Iowa 1987); FDIC v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 630 F. Supp.
1149, 1156-57 (W.D. La. 1986), both treating a D & 0 insurer's right to assert the policy's "insured v. insured" exclusion against the FDIC as successor to a failed bank.
166. See Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. FSLIC, No. CV87-6 MRP (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30,
1987); Parker v. Watts, No. 85-4654 (E.D. La. Feb. 27, 1987); Howard, supra note 46, at
169 n.18.
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Pokey and Markstone will succeed on the merits, or even survive a
motion to dismiss, will thus depend on the jurisdiction in which the
coverage action is commenced. Regardless of the jurisdiction,
South Brook should implead these officers. It need not worry
about Rule 11 sanctions in federal court or equivalent state sanctions. Even in a jurisdiction that has rejected such third-party
practice, the bonding company may proffer an equitable argument
for change in the law. Moreover, the notion of spreading loss between two insurance companies is not likely to offend the equitable
sense of any court.
D. Exclusion for Lost Interest and Profits
Happyvale submitted a proof of loss affidavit seeking to recover
the principal and interest it would have received in the event the
transactions with The Duck proceeded as expected. South Brook
should unquestionably deny coverage for that portion of the claim
representing lost interest. This is because the bond expressly excludes coverage for "potential income, including but not limited to
interest and dividends, not realized by the Insured." 16 ' In other
words, a loss is what the bank gives up, rather than what it expects
to get back but fails to receive in the future.16 Regardless of the
cause of a loss, anticipated profits are consequential, rather than
direct losses. In addition, the potential income exclusion has been
construed consistently to eliminate coverage for unrealized interest. 6 9 Therefore, assuming coverage existed for all loss sustained
by Happyvale, the bank would at most be entitled to the purchase
price of the loans, less the amount of return realized through October 1983.
IX.

A.

CONCLUSION

The Theme of the Bond

The blanket bond requires good faith reliance as a precondition
167. BOND LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 11.
168. See supra note 52.
169. Diversified Group, Inc. v. Van Tassel, 806 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1987); United
States Gypsum Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 813 F.2d 856 (7th Cir. 1987); St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Branch Bank & Trust Co., 643 F. Supp. 648 (E.D.N.C. 1986),
aff'd, 834 F.2d 416 (4th Cir. 1987); United S. Bank v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 548 F. Supp.
355 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); American Trust & Sav. Bank v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 418 N.W.2d 853 (Iowa 1988); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Lehrman Motors, Inc., 200 N.J.
Super. 319, 419 A.2d 729 (App. Div. 1984); Bank of Huntington v. Smothers, 626 S.W.2d
267 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); Lentz, Profit and the Potential Income Exclusion, 19 FORUM
694 (1984).
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to coverage under Insuring Clause (E). The bond's loan exclusion
precludes coverage for loss caused by false pretenses if the loss was
also caused by a bad business decision. Under Insuring Clause
(D), .a surety may deny coverage based on insufficient proximate
cause if the bank could have recovered its loss by proceeding directly against the maker or endorser of an instrument signed in
blank. Finally, the common law holds that one may not benefit
from the consequences of his own wrongdoing.
In combination, these rules are strikingly similar to those that
govern everyday human interaction. People offend one another
and this threatens to disrupt important collective activities. The
stability and duration of a relationship is determined by whether
the offended party accepts the excuses proffered by the offending
party. Ignorance, a lay concept equivalent to negligence, is the
most typical excuse offered. Most people give one another the benefit of the doubt. Therefore, if the excuse of ignorance is perceived
as genuine, most people will accept it and relationships will endure.
The result may be otherwise if the surrounding circumstances suggest that the offender "purposely" offended, should not have offended, could have easily avoided the offense by searching more
diligently for the truth, or chose to "look the other way."
Similar dynamics apply to coverage under the Bankers Blanket
Bond. If surrounding circumstances disclose that offensive behavior by the insured - its failure to take action that avoids loss resulted from unavoidable negligence or excusable ignorance, then
both the insurer and the court are likely to give the insured the
benefit of the doubt and afford it that most sublime form of protection, known as coverage. Should it become evident, however, that
the insured chose to be ignorant by looking the other way in the
face of suspicious circumstances, or made a bad business decision
by failing to take inexpensive precautions that could have avoided
all loss in the first place, its excuses may fall on deaf ears. Coverage, accordingly, may be denied. Insurance was not created entirely in the image of Man's compassion. Nonetheless, insurance
tends toward compassion -to the extent that this may be accomplished without eliminating important deterrents to loss-producing
conduct.
Insurance relationships are like human relationships. Just as a
policyholder gains peace of mind by purchasing protection in the
form of a contract that provides coverage for certain types of loss,
a man obtains peace of mind by insulating himself with the protection of others. Should either abuse these relationships, he may
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painfully discover that the protection, usually taken for granted,
suddenly has ceased.
B.

Happyvale's Future

Whether South Brook seeks to avoid all exposure or uses its coverage defenses as leverage in settling the claim,"'° it should pay the
full claim only if a final adjudication so requires.'
Although
South Brook's ability to deny or reduce coverage for Happyvale's
loss must necessarily result from a seemingly hyper-technical construction of the terms, conditions, agreements, definitions, and exclusions set forth in the blanket bond, such a result is also equitable
170. Regardless of its ultimate action, South Brook should set forth its defenses in
writing as early as possible because a subsequent bad faith claim by the insured may be
defeated by proof of genuine or debatable reasons for denying coverage. Insurance Co. of
N. Am. v. Citizensbank of Thomasville, 491 So. 2d 880, 884 (Ala. 1986). See also W.
SHERNOFF, S. GAGE & H. LEVINE, INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITIGATION §§ 5.01-5.44
(1987); Goldberg, Standards of Liabilityfor Bad Faith Refusal to Pay Benefits in First
Party Insurance, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 115 (1987).
171. Such an adjudication is a distinct possibility, notwithstanding the defenses to
coverage set forth in the text. Many judges allow their equitable concerns for the insured
to supersede an objective analysis of the insurance contract, with the result that decisions
tend to be outcome-oriented. Outcome oriented decisions diminish the predictability of
coverage determinations and thereby decrease the likelihood of extra-judicial settlements.
They encourage the insured to litigate coverage even when it appears that coverage is not
provided by the terms of the insurance policy. The consequential increase in the administrative costs of claims adjusting, settlements and judgments causes insurers to increase
premiums and/or further diminish policy coverage, both of which harm policyholders at
large. Thus, the cumulative impact of individual pro-insured decisions is a negative impact on insureds as a class. See Howard, "Continuous Trigger" Liability: Application To
Toxic Waste Cases And Impact On The Number Of "Occurrences", 22 TORT & INS. L.J.
624 (1987); Howard, D & 0 Insurance Through The Looking-Glass: An Attitudinal Primer, 38 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 163 (1988); Oettle & Howard, D & 0 Insurance:
Judicially TransformingA 'Duty To Pay' Policy Into A 'Duty To Defend' Policy, 22 TORT
& INS. L.J. 337 (1987); Oettle & Howard, Zuckerman And Sparks: The Validity of
'Claims Made' Insurance Policiesas a Function Of Retroactive Coverage, 21 TORT & INS.
L.J. 659 (1986). As for the general principle that good defensive arguments may have
absolutely no impact on a dispute's outcome, Aesop said it better than any insurance
lawyer could:
A Wolf, meeting with a Lamb astray from the fold, resolved not to lay violent
hands on him, but to find some plea to justify to the lamb the Wolf's right to eat
him. He thus addressed him: 'Sirrah, last year you grossly insulted me.' 'Indeed,' bleated the Lamb in a mournful tone of voice, 'I was not then born.' Then
said the Wolf, 'You feed in my pasture.' 'No, good sir,' replied the Lamb, 'I
have not yet tasted grass.' Again said the Wolf, 'You drink of my well.' 'No,'
exclaimed the Lamb, 'I never yet drank water, for as yet my mother's milk is
both food and drink to me.' Upon which the Wolf seized him and ate him up,
saying, 'Well! I won't remain supperless, even though you refute every one of
my imputations.'
Aesop, The Wolf and the Lamb, reprinted in AESOP'S FABLES 41 (Doubleday & Co., Inc.
1968).
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and accomplishes important public policy goals. For if Happyvale
must absorb all or a substantial portion of its loss, then Pokey and
Markstone will undoubtedly put their ducks in order before the
next Bronislav Korcynsky comes knocking at their door, with a
new first and last name, with the nickname "Fingers" - because
he was a classical pianist - and most importantly of all, with
promises of easy money!

